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ABSTRACT 
Charter Schools as Leverage for Special Education Reform  
by 
Tommy Chang 
Few studies have examined the intersection of charter school and special education policies.  The 
concerns around the serving of special education students in charter schools must be carefully 
studied, especially as charter schools continue to grow in numbers and continue to serve a greater 
percentage of public school students.  New policies must not only address equity in access for 
special education students in charter schools but must also study how charter schools can be 
leveraged to generate innovative and promising practices in the area of special education. 
This study examines a recent policy change in the Los Angeles Unified School District 
that provides great autonomy and increased accountability for charter schools in their provision 
of special education services.  This policy change promotes key tenets of charter schools: (a) 
autonomy and decentralization, (b) choice and competition, and (c) performance-based 
accountability with the aim of increasing access for students with special needs and increasing 
the capacity of charter schools to serve them.  The research design utilizes a mixed method 
approach to collect qualitative and quantitative data to evaluate the goals of this major policy 








Education, at its most fundamental level, can be characterized by the provision of 
learning in the environment most suitable to a student’s needs.  Special education and charter 
school policies hope to individualize the learning environment for students, albeit with two 
different approaches.   
Under the federal special education law, known as the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA), any student identified by one or more of the specific categories of 
disability is assured a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in the least restrictive 
environment (LRE).  The Individualized Education Plan (IEP) outlines the educational goals and 
needs for each eligible student and IEPs are reviewed and updated annually.  The intent of 
federal legislation is to ensure that students with special needs are provided access to a high 
quality public education, which is the fair and moral responsibility of a civilized society.  Special 
education laws have secured greater educational success for many of the youth in our country.  
However, despite its intent to protect society’s neediest individuals, special education is 
sometimes characterized as over-whelming, over-regulated, and overly complex even though 
special education laws, mandates, and regulations.  Finn, Rotherham, & Hokanson (2001) 
explain that IDEA has resulted in many unintended consequences and unfortunately, it is often 
considered taboo to discuss such problems.  “Well-intentioned people who have attempted to 
highlight deficiencies, inequities, and problems with special education have been criticized as 
interlopers with bad motives and political agendas” (p. 7).    
	  2 
Charter school policies, on the other hand, are fundamentally grounded on the ideals of 
deregulation and autonomy.  Born out of the school choice movement, charter schools are 
exempt from many state and local regulations.  When compared to special education laws, rules 
associated to operating charter schools tend to be less reaching and more localized to the 
agreement between the charter school and its authorizing agency.  Known as the “charter,” this 
agreement acts as the guiding document for the work of the charter school and spells out the 
working relationship between the charter school and its authorizer.  In return for greater 
autonomy, charter schools are subject to more accountability and expected to net greater returns.  
But, because charter schools are fundamentally public schools, they are subject to federal laws 
related to educating students with special needs.  O’Neill, Wenning, and Giovannetti (2002) 
comment that federal special education laws can impose restrictions on charter schools that be 
seen as running counter to the intent of charter school policies and “because federal disability 
laws in general were enacted before the advent of charter schools; and courts have so far said 
very little on this point, the link between charters and special education is murky” (p. 1).   
Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) is the nation’s second largest school 
district and its largest authorizer of charter schools in the country with over 210 charter schools 
serving more than 110,000 students.  The California Charter Schools Act (1992) outlines several 
purposes for charter schools.  They include (a) providing parents and pupils with expanded 
choices in the types of educational opportunities that are available within the public school 
system; (b) providing vigorous competition within the public school system to stimulate 
continual improvement in all public schools; and (c) holding the schools established under this 
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part accountable for meeting measurable pupil outcomes, thus shifting from a rule-based to 
performance-based accountability system.   
Given this clear intent, it should not be surprising that charter schools are seen as 
unwelcome competitors by some supporters of the traditional school system.  The issue of 
charter schools has clearly polarized the education community and the limitations of current 
resources have unfortunately exacerbated the “us vs. them” mentality.  For some, charter schools 
represent “an exciting vehicle of school reform; for others, especially those in control of the 
traditional public school system, they are a threat” (Hill, 2006, p. 1).   
As the greater education debate on choice and autonomy is occurring throughout the 
country, the microscope is squarely placed on the LAUSD as the school district continues to 
debate and define itself in light of the tensions between charter school supporters and those that 
support traditional public schools (TPS). Nowhere else in the nation is this debate more intense.  
Kerchner, Menefee-Libey, Mulfinger & Clayton (2008) believe that charter schools are creating 
a new paradigm for what a school district should be and blurring the line between public and 
private.  They state, in reference to Los Angeles and the role charter schools play in school 
reform: 
The very idea of a public school district is changing gradually.  The district has a 
contractual relationship with the charters rather than a managerial one.  Among 
metropolitan-sized school districts, LAUSD may be closer to contracting-out model 
proposed by policy scholars Paul Hill, Larry Pierce, and James Guthrie than any in the 
country.  The district has become partly operator, partly contractor, and, through its 
choices of charter operators, partly the holder of a portfolio of schools (p. 199).   
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It is important to contextualize the role of charter schools in LAUSD’s overall reform 
efforts and its push for school autonomy.  From the work during the 1990s of Los Angeles 
Educational Alliance for Restructuring Now (LEARN) to Small Learning Communities that 
were the foundation of LAUSD’s massive school building program over the last decade to more 
recent creation of pilot schools and Expanded School-Based Management Model schools, all 
these district reform efforts are grounded on the theory of change that shifting control closer to 
the school site leads to better educational decision making.  Proponents for autonomy have 
argued that “granting schools additional flexibility can be an effective strategy for encouraging 
innovation and change in educational practice” (Dillion, 2011, p. 3).  In LAUSD, reform efforts 
towards increased autonomy of schools have also been coupled with reform efforts to provide 
choice for families.  The Belmont Zone of Choice, modeled after the Boston Pilot Schools 
Network, started in 2007 as a cluster of high schools near downtown Los Angeles.  Students 
entering high school that live in Belmont attendance area may choose from 13 small learning 
communities, many of them pilot schools.  These schools are given waivers from district policies 
and collective bargaining agreement so to provide increased flexibility and autonomy in 
exchange for increased accountability and the expectation to be more innovative.  These in-
district reforms blend the characteristics of TPS and charter schools. 
Charter schools are seen as the ultimate form of autonomy and choice in public schools 
as charter schools are independently operated.  They are freed from many of the policies and 
regulations of the traditional school districts, with control over their curriculum, scheduling, 
budgeting, and staffing as well coupled with an open enrollment process.  Thus, it begs one to 
understand how charter schools can be used as part of a school district’s strategy to provide the 
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best education for its students.  Specifically, this study hopes to investigate whether policies that 
espouse the tenets of charter schools, such as autonomy, competition, and accountability, can be 
enacted to improve educational opportunities for students with disabilities (SWD). 
Statement of Problem 
The dichotomy between the highly regulated nature of special education and the less 
regulated nature of charter schools has often resulted in tension and misunderstanding as charter 
schools work through federal, state, and local mandates to meet needs of their special education 
students (Ahearn, Lang, Rhim, & McLaughlin, 2001).  While charter schools are exempt from 
many state and local regulations, they are public schools and thus are subject to federal laws and 
regulations relating to the education of SWD.  However, there is ambiguity and lack of 
specificity in regards to the role and responsibilities of charter schools versus its authorizer in 
regards to special education.  Rhim, Ahearn, and Lange (2007) point out that policy makers have 
struggled to establish guidelines and parameters for the educating of SWD in charter schools.  
This is due to the highly nuanced nature of the statutes that shape the responsibility for special 
education in the charter sector.  It is clear that charter schools, like all other publicly funded 
schools, must abide by the IDEA but what is unclear is the extent of that responsibility.  The 
legal status of a particular charter schools can vary but two possible types of relationships 
dominate.  A charter school can act as its own local education agency (LEA) or act as part of an 
existing LEA for purposes of special education.  Under IDEA regulations, if a charter school is 
part of an LEA, the LEA is responsible for educating students with disabilities who enroll in 
charter schools as it would with any students who enroll in other district schools, including 
providing any supplementary and relative services as dictated through the IEP process.  If a 
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charter school is its own LEA, it is completely responsible for the special education programs 
and services of all its special needs students and must ensure the provision of FAPE.   
Historically, LAUSD has had an alternative arrangement with its charter schools.  
According to California state law, every school must belong in a Special Education Local Plan 
Area (SELPA), an entity that receives and allocates special education funding to individuals 
schools, districts, and counties that belong to its membership.  (This topic will be discussed 
further in the next section.)  Because LAUSD acts as its own SELPA due to its incredible size, 
charter schools approved by LAUSD belong, by default, in its SELPA.  However, LAUSD does 
not take on the full responsibility of special education in charter schools as they do of their TPS 
and at the same time, charter schools do not act truly as their own LEA.  The current 
arrangement is often described as a “hybrid” arrangement requiring charter schools to serve and 
provide services for the majority of students with special needs but, in exchange, receive only a 
portion of the charter school’s special education funding, currently 60-73%.  This arrangement 
has caused significant confusion and policy tension.  One such example is as follows: When a 
wheel-chaired bound student enrolls into a charter school that resides in a non-ADA (American 
Disabilities Act) compliant facility, how do the charter and the district share in the responsibility 
of ensuring access to that student?  This confusion regarding jurisdiction and compliance with 
ADA access in non-district charter school facilities was highlighted in recent years by the press 
(Llanos, 2010).  Another such example is as follows: When a student is placed in a non-public 
school placement by a charter school, which entity is responsible for that student’s education 
once the student reaches an age beyond the charter school’s grade span of operation, the charter 
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school or the authorizing district?  These examples are a few of the myriad of perplexing 
predicaments that face charter schools and their authorizing school district. 
Unfortunately, this confusion and tension has resulted in widespread criticism towards 
charter schools by many sectors of the education community, including researchers, advocates, 
politicians, and union leaders.  It is often heard that charter schools are unwilling to serve 
students with disabilities and that schools “counsel out” families who wish to enroll their 
children that have disabilities.  While some others acknowledge that charter schools do serve 
students with disabilities, they also point out that charter schools are unwilling and ill-prepared 
to serve students with the most severe needs and that charters are only willing to serve those 
students who have mild to moderate disabilities.  A recent statement from a LAUSD board 
member underscores these criticisms, “this disturbing evidence in combination with some of the 
other statistics we are getting paint a very disturbing picture and raise questions on whether 
public charters really serve all children" (Llanos, 2010).   
 These criticisms politicize the discussion and serve as another example of the evolving 
relationship between researchers and public policy as noted by Jeffrey Henig (2008), a professor 
of political science and education at Columbia University.  He explains that research is often 
used in partisan debates over educational policies and makes the case that researchers, editors, 
reporters, and policy makers all share in the blame for the polarization of the debate over charter 
schools.  Unfortunately, the challenge of special education and the serving of students with 
disabilities have recently taken center-stage in this debate.   
For example, Frankenberg, Siegel-­‐Hawley, and Wang (2010) documented more 
stratification of students in charter schools as compared to TPS and pointed out research that 
	  8 
suggests “a propensity for charter schools to serve lower numbers of ELLs and students with 
disabilities” (p. 17).  The foreword of this study, written by Gary Orfield, Professor of Education, 
Law, Political Science and Urban Planning at UCLA, makes the statement that “the charter 
school movement has been a major political success, but it has been a civil rights failure” (p. 1). 
More recently, in an article for the Huffington Post about the importance of magnet schools, he 
again points out the disappointing performance of charter schools as it pertains to increasing 
segregation (Orfield, 2011).  It should be noted that a recent study by LAUSD’s Office of the 
Independent Monitor, “revealed several areas within magnet schools’ policies and procedures 
that appear to be in violation of federal and state laws pertaining to the education of SWD” 
(Office of the Independent Monitor, 2011, p. 1) and that less than 4% of students attending 
magnet schools are students with disabilities, a percentage significantly lower than found in 
charter schools. 
While statistics support that the special education demographic in charter schools may 
differ from that of TPS, it is also clear that charter schools recognize the legal responsibility to 
serve all students and are working to provide “high quality and compliant special education 
services to an increased number and broader range of students with exceptional needs, by 
building a statewide infrastructure of resources that supports the flexible and autonomous nature 
of charter schools” (“Special Education in California,” n.d.).   
The challenge of serving special education students should not be an arena of dispute but 
a challenge that is embraced by all sectors of education.  Charter schools are designed to offer 
innovative educational strategies and this should include how they provide individualized 
support to meet the needs of SWD. 
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Overview of Knowledge Base 
Charter schools are public schools operated apart from traditional school district 
bureaucracies and receive freedoms from many aspects of the state education code and district 
policies and procedures.  For example, in California, charter schools are not bound to 
determining layoffs by seniority and following California education code for suspension and 
expulsion policies.  The first charter school opened in Minnesota in 1992 as a result of the work 
between a coalition of progressives and conservatives that proposed and passed the first state 
charter legislation.  Now, with continual growth over the last two decades, charter schools 
presently exist in some 40 states, including the District of Columbia, totaling over 5,000 schools 
and serving over 1.6 million students (“Charter Schools 101: The Most Frequently Asked 
Questions,” n.d.).   
 Charter Schools in California.  Shortly after Minnesota enacted its charter school 
legislation, California became the second state in the country to pass a charter school law when 
Senator Gary Hart proposed a bill to create charter schools in California.  Then-governor Pete 
Wilson signed the Charter Schools Act of 1992 which spells out the purpose of charter schools in 
California as follows: 
(a) Improve pupil learning. 
(b) Increase learning opportunities for all pupils, with special emphasis on expanded 
learning experiences for pupils who are identified as academically low achieving. 
(c) Encourage the use of different and innovative teaching methods. 
(d) Create new professional opportunities for teachers, including the opportunity to be 
responsible for the learning program at the schoolsite. 
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(e) Provide parents and pupils with expanded choices in the types of educational 
opportunities that are available within the public school system. 
(f) Hold the schools established under this part accountable for meeting measurable pupil 
outcomes, and provide the schools with a method to change from rule-based to 
performance-based accountability systems. 
(g) Provide vigorous competition within the public school system to stimulate continual 
improvements in all public schools  
(Charter Schools Act,1992). 
The language of the California Charter Schools Act of 1992 has caused much debate.  On 
one side, some see charter schools as an attack to the existing, traditional public school system, 
and this policy is “part of a larger deregulation reform agenda in public” (Lubienski & Weitzel, 
2010, p. 1).  On the other side, some see charter schools as the reform effort needed to transform 
public education.  Specifically, the California Charter Schools Act (1992) does outline key 
concepts that situate charter schools in the midst of the reform agenda. 
Firstly, charter schools espouse the ideals of autonomy and decentralization.  Charter 
schools are to operate outside the system of the traditional school district and governed outside 
the traditional school board.  Charter schools typically set up their own board of directors and are 
free to create a governance structure that meets the needs of their schools.  They are often 
directly funded and in California, charter schools receive greater flexibility by receiving block 
funding for categorical funds. 
Secondly, California’s charter schools legislation dictates that choice and competition are 
intended to stimulate improvement in all public schools.  Charter schools offer the opportunity to 
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increase competitive forces within the educational marketplace by ensuring that, as students 
move between charter and traditional schools, funding accompanies the students.  For example, a 
high school student who leaves a TPS and enrolls in a charter school takes the funding associated 
with her.  In other words, competitive forces are infused into public education as students “vote 
with their feet,” similar to the economic marketplace.  As more charter schools come to 
existence, greater opportunity for competition comes into play.  Theoretically, with increased 
marketplace competition, there is a greater incentive placed on educators to produce better 
results to attract more families and students.   
Thirdly, legislators articulate quite clearly that there is intent to move from “rule-based” 
systems of accountability to more “performance-based” systems of accountability.  By design, 
charter schools possess more flexibility and autonomy in governance, operations, and most 
importantly curriculum and instruction.  In return for the flexibility and autonomy, charter 
schools are assumed to perform better.  Miron (2010) describes three forms of accountability for 
charter schools: regulatory, market, and performance.  While charter schools do have freedoms 
from district policies and procedures as well as freedoms from many constraints of California’s 
state education code, they must still be in compliance with relevant state and federal laws and 
regulations, including special education.  In addition, charter schools are more accountable to 
parents and students because in most cases, charters school, unlike district schools, have no 
attendance boundaries and families can make the decision to leave a charter school and enroll 
into another charter school or district school.  Lastly, charter schools are bound to meet goals and 
academic targets as stipulated in their charters.  In California, authorizing agencies approve 
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charter schools to operate in 5-year cycles.  Every five years, charter schools must be re-
authorized through a process that involves the demonstration of progress through use of data.   
While the simple market place model of competition coupled with high accountability 
seems logical, much more research is needed to truly determine if these forces lead to overall 
improvement in public schools.  It is important to note that there is significant counter-narrative 
to the marketplace model in education.  Ni and Arsen (2010) state that there is no clear evidence 
that competition by charter schools either induces improvements or causes harm in public school 
districts.  “The state of current research recommends a wait-and-see position in the charter 
school policy debate.  It is too early to draw firm conclusions on the systemic effects of charter 
schools” (Ni & Arsen, 2010, p. 119).  In an essay on charter schools, Payne and Knowles (2009) 
state that: 
When the stars are in alignment, charter schools give us a means to do an end-run around 
inflexible and incompetent bureaucracies to give some children a better education than 
they would otherwise have access to. But this doesn’t mean charters are a panacea for the 
ills of urban systems writ large. They are a good deal more difficult to do well than was 
originally understood; and when done well, they are difficult to scale up. We see little 
evidence substantiating the early hopes that charters would, through healthy competition, 
spur improvements in traditional districts. That idea was probably always based on a 
series of false assumptions about the capacities of urban systems. However, we think that 
some of the recent flexibility demonstrated by some unions toward workplace regulations 
is partly in response. (p. 232) 
	  13 
Lubienski (2003) examines the lack of evidence that choice and competition have provoked 
innovation and change in charter schools.  Rather, he suggests that policy intervention, rather 
than market forces, have spurred the more frequent innovations. 
Special Education in California Charter Schools.  In their study of 41 of the 50 states, 
Rhim et al. (2007) outlined five relationships between authorizing agencies and their charter 
schools: (a) all charter schools are LEAs; (b) all charter schools are part of an LEA; (c) status 
depends on the authorizer; (d) status depends on type of school; and (e) status chosen by the 
charter school.  California is the lone state, other than the District of Columbia, that allows for 
charter schools to choose whether they would like to act as a LEA or exist as a LEA for the 
purposes of special education.  While states that allow only one type of relationship struggle with 
the nuances between charter schools and their authorizer for purposes of special education, the 
complexities in California are exacerbated with the fact that charter schools have various 
choices. 
In their extensive report to the U.S. Department of Education, Ahearn et al. (2001) 
elaborate on this point by stating that charter schools already struggle to understand their exact 
role and responsibility and thus fail to build the necessary systems and expertise to provide 
special education and related services to students with disabilities.  In California, charter schools 
and their LEAs are influenced by a third element, the SELPA.  The SELPA serves as the entity 
that receives funding from the state and allocates resources to its member schools, districts or 
counties.  It also serves as a governance structure for its members and creates the operational 
policies and procedures for special education programs and service delivery within its members.  
Special education funding in California totaled $4.7 billion in 2006-07 and these funds are 
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allocated to the 120 SELPAs that coordinate special education services between schools and 
school districts (Lipscomb, 2009).  Funding in California is based on the average daily 
attendance (ADA) of a SELPA, not the disability counts and special education expenditures and 
not a “census-based or capitation model” (Lipscomb, 2009, p. 10) that is found in most other 
states.  Thus, California’s relationship among charter school operators, authorizers, and SELPAs 
is fraught with confusion.  Issues are further intensified by complicated funding systems, 
particularly for charter schools which tend to be small in size and lack knowledge regarding 
local, state, and federal funding and reporting policies and procedures.     
In order to receive special education funding, charter schools in California must belong to 
the SELPA of its authorizing agency or they must become a LEA for the purposes of special 
education to join a LEA somewhere in the state.  While charter schools are considered part of a 
school district for purposes of special education in most cases, few have membership within a 
SELPA as its own LEA (Snell, 2004, p. 12).  According to Guarino and Chau (2003), charter 
schools create memorandums of understanding to establish their legal liability and working 
relationship with their SELPA.   
Because special education is an under-funded mandate, special education expenditures 
typically exceed revenues.  This results in “encroachment” of special education expenditures into 
a school’s general funds.  In their study of charter schools in California, Guarino and Chau 
(2003) revealed that there was no significant disparity between the encroachment of charter 
schools versus TPS and that both cover 65 to 75% of special education expenditures with special 
education funding.  Unfortunately, the situation with LAUSD charter schools is different, at least 
based on recent data.    
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Special Education in LAUSD Charters.  LAUSD has historically an alternative 
arrangement with its charter schools.  Because LAUSD is a single-district SELPA, charter 
schools authorized by LAUSD belong in its SELPA.  However, using boilerplate language 
embedded within the charter petition document and a required memorandum of understanding, 
charter schools are required to act as a “hybrid” entity for purposes of special education.   
Historically, charter schools have opposed becoming truly schools of the district for 
various reasons.  Charter schools, in general, seek autonomy so any policies that take away from 
programmatic autonomies are confronted with resistance.  In addition, TPSs of LAUSD pay an 
encroachment exceeding $1,400 per ADA for the provision of special education services.  For 
such reasons, charter schools compromised under a unique agreement between LAUSD and its 
authorized charter schools where charters currently pay 27-40% of their special education 
funding to the school district as part of their “proportionate” share.  They retain the remaining 
percentage of their special education funding to be used for the serving students with disabilities.  
LAUSD retains the responsibility of non-public school placements and due process in cases 
when it is deemed necessary.  
Furthermore, this complicated dilemma must be considered in the context of a school 
district that has experienced historical failures in the provision of special education.  Since 1996, 
the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) has been under federal court oversight for its 
compliance with the federal laws as dictated by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  The original Chanda Smith Consent Decree of 1996 
was amended in 2003 and a court-appointed Independent Monitor (IM) was assigned with the 
responsibility of ensuring LAUSD’s compliance with the Modified Consent Decree (MCD) and 
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relevant special education.  At this moment, the IM has yet to certify that LAUSD has met the 
three necessary steps in order to disengage from the MCD: achievement of 18 outcomes, 
substantial compliance with applicable special education laws and regulations, and substantial 
compliance with program accessibility requirements.  
In recent years, charter schools have become a subject of many of the IM’s reports.  
While some charter schools and charter school organizations have argued that they are not party 
to the federal court oversight, the IM and LAUSD argue otherwise.  They point to language 
within the MCD that implies that charter schools must adhere to the requirements of the MCD.  
Because of LAUSD’s large number of charter schools, the performance of charter school 
students has a significant impact on the district’s ability to exit from the MCD.  According to the 
Office of the Independent Monitor (2009), students with special needs make up 11.3% of 
LAUSD’s student population while only 7.6% of the charter school population.  The report also 
found that students with severe disabilities only make up 1% of the total enrollment at charter 
schools while within LAUSD, they make up 3%.   LAUSD officials state that charter schools are 
leaving an unfair financial and educational burden on traditional schools to serve special 
education students.  LAUSD’s special education expenditures exceed $1.3 billion while special 
education funding comes in at approximately $550 million, leaving an excess cost that 
encroaches into the general education funds of the school district.  Charter schools, in their 
opinion, do not pay their equitable share of this encroachment. 
Charter schools, on the other hand, claim that they should have the autonomy to create 
and operate their own special education programs that best meet their specific student needs.  If 
charter schools in LAUSD were truly schools of the district, LAUSD would keep all the special 
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education funding and provides all services to charter schools, taking all the autonomy away 
from them.  Furthermore, charter schools would be obligated to accept the same type and quality 
of district special education services as LAUSD traditional schools.  This would take away all 
ability to leverage charter school policy to innovate for the needs of special education students.  
Charter schools argue that in order to be innovative, they should have the ability to access their 
full special education funding.  Snell (2004) explains that because charter schools tend to be 
small, they lack the economies of scale to reduce the cost of special education services, making 
access to any available funding that much more crucial.  In the case of LAUSD, due to the 
exceedingly high encroachment of special education, the proportionate share for charter schools 
continues to increase, costs that charters in LAUSD argue they should not have to share.  This 
argument was highlighted in a 2003 Los Angeles Daily News article that reported LAUSD 
proposed taking 40% of special education funding from two charter schools awaiting renewal 
from the school district.  The two schools, Vaughn Next Century Learning Center and Fenton 
Avenue Charter Schools in the Northeast San Fernando Valley, would have lost $600,000 in 
special education funding, creating detrimental consequences for the 400 students of special 
needs served at those schools (Gao, 2003, p. N3).  This issue highlights the policy tensions that 
grow ever more difficult to resolve given the steady increase of special education expenditures in 
education. 
A significant state policy change occurred in January 2010 when the California State 
Board of Education (SBE) approved the California Department of Education’s recommendation 
to allow charter schools to apply and gain membership into SELPA’s outside of their region.  No 
longer are charters bound to their authorizer or a geographic approximate SELPA for special 
	  18 
education membership.  While LAUSD protested the legal authority of the California SBE to 
make such a decision, 21 charter schools authorized by LAUSD applied and were accepted as 
members of the El Dorado County Charter SELPA, a SELPA located near Sacramento, CA.  
(LAUSD Board of Education, 2011).   
As a result of the SBE’s decision and the looming expiration of the current “hybrid 
arrangement” after the 2010-2011 school year, 70 additional charter schools submitted written 
notices to LAUSD with their intent to exit LAUSD’s SELPA in July 2011.  While those charter 
schools that leave LAUSD to join another SELPA must demonstrate the program, fiscal 
capacity, experience and infrastructure to be deemed an LEA, it is LAUSD’s position that charter 
schools that join out-of-geographic SELPAs will have negative consequences for students, 
families and the school district.  The SELPA accepting the charter schools do not assume the 
responsibility for providing programs and services for students with disabilities attending the 
charter school.  Families and students will likely be confused with the disconnection from 
LAUSD’s SELPA.  Parents who wish to seek direct answers to their questions must look to a 
SELPA that is possibly a far distance away.  To make this even more problematic for LAUSD, 
the school district must still continue to monitor those charter schools that have departed 
because, as their authorizer, they are still bound by the MCD and LAUSD’s progress on the 
outcomes.   
Also, as a school district with declining enrollment, LAUSD continues to see a drop in 
their general education and special education funding.  Simultaneously, special education 
enrollment has not decreased and with less funding, encroachment continues to increase.  Charter 
schools that leave the SELPA will take special education funding to another SELPA.  If charter 
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schools do not enroll and serve students with disabilities at the same level and with the same 
eligibilities as traditional LAUSD schools, the issue will be exacerbated.  
A Major Policy Change 
A solution for charter schools for purposes of special education must be accompanied 
with greater reform in special education throughout the school district.  Reform efforts must 
center on both policy creation in the form of mandates, inducements, and capacity-building 
instruments as suggested by McDonnell and Elmore (1987) and the tenets of a portfolio approach 
to schools. 
Thus, in order to prevent charter schools from leaving, a small workgroup was created by 
the Superintendent of LAUSD to explore a solution that would create a viable option for charter 
schools to stay in LAUSD’s SELPA.  The work group was faced with three key challenges: 
1. A governance structure that allows charter schools a voice to inform the Board of 
Education and the Superintendent 
2. A funding formula that allows charter schools to receive an equitable share of special 
education funding without significantly contributing to the excessive encroachment 
costs of the school district 
3. A model for service delivery that allows for service sharing between charter schools 
and district schools 
After months of work, a framework for a possible solution was taken to the LAUSD Board of 
Education in January 2011 and it passed unanimously.  The framework integrates many of the 
recommendations set forth by Ahearn et al. (2001) including policy guidance for charters on its 
legal responsibilities under IDIEA and related state laws, and permitting charter schools to 
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consider a variety of options to meet their special education responsibilities different ways to 
operate within LAUSD’s special education infrastructure.   
The reorganization would maintain LAUSD SELPA’s status as a single district SELPA, 
while creating two divisions of the SELPA, one for traditional district operated programs and 
one for the Charter Operated Programs (COP). The entire SELPA would be administered by a 
single SELPA Administrator and governed by the existing LAUSD Board of Education, who 
would each be advised by a committee of district and charter school representatives. A District 
Operated Program Director and COP Director would manage day-to-day operations and program 
oversight for each division, respectively.   
The following diagram displays the two branches of LAUSD’s SELPA.  District schools 
and charter schools who choose to become truly schools of the district will belong to the left 
hand side of the SELPA called District Operated Programs.  Charter schools that wish to act as 
LEAs for the purpose of special education will join the newly formed COP on the right hand 









The LAUSD Board of Education, with this reorganization, hopes to: 
• Provide charters schools with the flexibility and autonomy to fully operate and be 
accountable for their own special education programs; 
• Provide charters schools with the opportunity to participate in SELPA-level decisions 
affecting their school; 
Figure 1.  The reorganization diagram for the restructuring of LAUSD’s SELPA.  
Adapted from LAUSD Board of Education Report 149-10/11 on January 4, 2011. 
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• Provide LAUSD revenue from charter operated schools towards administration of special 
education programs; 
• Allow LAUSD and charter schools to mutually benefit from the programs, services and 
expertise available in both District operated and charter programs; 
• Build capacity for charter and District operated schools to serve all students with 
disabilities regardless of eligibility status.   
(LAUSD Board of Education Report 149-10/11, 2011) 
Charter schools operating under the “hybrid” approach will be phased out as charter 
schools must become a school of the district with all responsibilities and privileges extended to 
any other school within LAUSD or become an LEA-like entity that operate autonomously for 
purposes of special education.  If a charter school chooses to become a school of the district 
under the district operated program side, LAUSD will retain all special education funds in 
exchange for taking all responsibility and liability for serving students with disabilities.  In 
addition, charter schools pay its “proportionate” share similar to any other school of the district, 
currently $1,071 per students from its general education budget.  If a charter school chooses to 
become LEA-like under the charter operated program side, it will receive all its special education 
funds, minus an administrative fee paid for using LAUSD’s existing SELPA infrastructure, for 
the complete responsibility of all special education and related services.  The reorganization of 
LAUSD’s SELPA thus aims to remove the confusion of the hybrid relationship between the 
school district and its charter schools.  The newly formed division provides the opportunity, in 
essence, to create a new SELPA within the support structure of an existing one and will be 
guided by a steering committee of the charter schools that choose to participate in this new 
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option.  All charter schools must eventually become a member of this new division or become 
truly a school-of-the-district for the purposes of special education. 
Charter schools and district schools will continue to participate in the current governance 
structure but charter schools will have a voice within the advisory committee that will inform 
decisions made by the SELPA administrator and the LAUSD Board of Education.  Furthermore, 
a mechanism for the sharing of services will be created so best practices and service providing 
can be exchanged between the two programs. Lastly, data must be analyzed annually over a 
three-year period and a report submitted to the Board of Education to inform the Board of 
successes and challenges with this the reorganization. 
Major reasons for charter schools’ decisions to stay or leave LAUSD’s SELPA center on 
autonomy and fiscal issues.  It is the desire that the reorganization of LAUSD’s SELPA provides 
fair options for charter schools to stay and meets the desires of the school district.  More 
importantly, the reorganization hopes to ensure the equal access for students with special needs 
in all schools, particularly increasing access for students with special needs in charter schools 
and the increasing capacity within charter schools to serve those students.   
Purpose and Significance of Study 
 Few studies have examined the challenges of charter school and special education 
policies.  Those studies that do exist identify the issues associated with charter schools and 
special education but none offer up much in terms of policy solutions.  The concerns around the 
serving of special education students in charter schools must be studied carefully as charter 
schools continue to grow in numbers and serve a greater percentage of public school students.  
Changes in policy must address issues beyond equity in access for special education students in 
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charter schools but must study how charter schools can be leveraged to generate innovative and 
promising practices in the area of special education. 
 Launching July 1, 2011 with a group of charter schools and a newly hired director, the 
newly formed COP in LAUSD hopes to accomplish this very task.  One purposeful outcome of 
this study can be to inform the LAUSD Board of Education of the successes and challenges of 
this new division within LAUSD’s SELPA.  Specifically, this study aims to evaluate changes in 
access for students with special needs over the course of the first two years of implementation 
and to evaluate programmatic changes as a result of changes in capacity.  For this study, capacity 
is defined as financial resources, services and programs.  Moreover, this dissertation hopes to 
determine if education policies that espouse charter school tenets can be used to drive special 
education reform. 
As long as special education remains an underfunded mandate, there will continue to be a 
desperate need to strive for stronger programs and better services for students with special needs.  
Thus, this new opportunity anticipates the bringing forth of best practices that can inform reform 
efforts within the greater school system in Los Angeles for students of special needs.   
Conceptual Framework 
 
A conceptual framework was created for the purposes of this study that brings together 
policy instruments and charter school tenets to explain the particular outcomes of the recent 
LAUSD policy that reorganized its COP and created the COP.  
Charter schools are public schools operated outside of the confines of traditional school 
district policies and procedures and receive freedoms from many constraints of state education 
codes.  They are often, fairly or unfairly, considered by some as part of the neoliberal education 
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agenda that leverages ideals of accountability and competition in order to reform the challenges 
of our current education system.  Sloan (2008) explains that neoliberalism refers to a free-market 
ideology that has shaped the U.S. education reform agenda over the last decade, hoping to shift 
the ways schools are structure and operated.  Critics such as Lipman (2003) believe that such 
ideals resonate with communities and the general public that are frustrated with the current 
situation of public schools and given “an absence of counterhegemonic discourses” (p. 373), the 
neoliberal ideology has caught hold in many current educational practices. 
Critical theorists would argue that a marketplace view of education will only “work 
against the class interests of those students who are most politically and economically vulnerable 
within society” (Darder, Baltodano & Torres, 2003, p. 10).  Thus, within the context of a 
capitalistic system found in our country, an education system that encourages competition 
between schools will only serve to exacerbate the gap between the haves and the have-nots.  
Recent critics such as Ravitch (2010) denounce free market model of competition and choice and  
state that “the rhetoric of many charter school advocates has come to sound uncannily similar to 
the rhetoric of voucher proponents and of the most rabid haters of public schooling” (p. 146). 
Despite the criticisms, neoliberal ideals are prevalent in the current educational reform 
movement.  The California Charter Schools Act (1992) outlines several purposes for charter 
schools that clearly delineate a theory of change that can supports such neoliberal ideals.  They 
include: (a) providing parents and pupils with expanded choices in the types of educational 
opportunities that are available within the public school system; (b) providing vigorous 
competition within the public school system to stimulate continual improvement in all public 
schools; and (c) holding the schools established under this part accountable for meeting 
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measurable pupil outcomes, and provide the schools with a method to change from rule-based to 
performance-based accountability systems.  Thus, it is clear that policy makers, in writing the 
Charter Schools Act, believe that market forces can elicit school improvement.   
Policy makers use instruments in order to elicit particular results.  McDonnell and Elmore 
(1987) explain that “policies work by bringing the resources of government—money, rules, and 
authority—into the service of political objectives; and by using those resources to influence the 
actions of individuals and institutions” (p. 133).  In their discussion about alternative policy 
instruments, they classify policies into four generic classes of instruments: mandates, 
inducements, capacity-building, and system-changing. Successful policies utilize multiple 
instruments to capture the various dimensions and nuances of complex systems, considering 
motivations (rules, money, and authority), expected effects, primary costs and benefits, and the 
time-frame.  In order to accomplish policy objectives, the choice of instrument, the context, and 
the implementation are all critical to its effectiveness.   
The policy to reorganize LAUSD’s SELPA leverages characteristics of all four classes of 
policy instruments.  It mandates rule changes for charter school participation in LAUSD’s 
SELPA.  It induces charter schools to take on more responsibilities in exchange for more 
financial resources.  It seeks to build capacity by networking charter schools to work 
collaboratively on program development and service delivery.  It also changes the system in 
which charter schools participate in the governance of LAUSD’s SELPA. 
More importantly, the SELPA reorganization promotes key tenets of charter schools: (a) 
autonomy and decentralization, (b) choice and competition, and (c) performance-based 
accountability within the construct of LAUSD’s SELPA with the hope of bringing about greater 
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change within the system.  It is hypothesized that these tenets can be leveraged, within the highly 
regulated, centralized, and compliance-driven context of special education, to lead to greater 











On a higher policy level, it is critical to understand if charter schools, alongside other 
school choice reforms, are the best approach of a school district to provide the best education for 
its students.  More specifically, do policy makers in LAUSD strategically utilize charter schools 
or tenets of charter schools to improve the educational outcomes for all students?  This is critical 
	  
Figure 2.  Conceptual framework for LAUSD SELPA reorganization. 
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part of the conceptual framework for this research project.  Can charter schools, as delineated by 
the California Charter Schools Act (1992), provide expanded choices for students with special 
needs as well as improve programs and services in all public schools through vigorous 
competition?  While answering this question is not the purpose of this study, it is the hope that 
the outcomes of this study can be used to further the understanding of whether the role of charter 
schools will continue to grow and/or important characteristics found in charter schools will 
continue to gain prominence in all LAUSD schools. 
 The key tenets of the conceptual framework to be explored are summarized below. 
 
Autonomy and Decentralization.  Hill, Pierce, and Guthrie (1997) espouse the concept 
of a contractual school system in which school boards and central school staff move out of the 
operational role into the contracting role.  Instead of focusing on the day-to-day operations of 
running schools, school boards and a small central office oversees “a portfolio of diverse schools 
operated by a private group” (p. 6) and individual schools would truly manage their own 
operations, make their own decisions, and be completely accountable for their performance.  In 
visualizing this system, many have used the analogy of a lattice or spider web and “at the center 
of the network, a small core staff provides strategic direction and support” (Kerchner et. al., 
2008, p. 221).   
 Charter schools serve as an ideal participant in this concept of a portfolio approach to 
running a school district.  They are independent from the governance structure of a school 
district, operated by its own governance board and management team and can receive funding 
directly from the state.  In California, charter schools receive the vast majority of their funding 
from a general purpose grant and a categorical block grant that substitute for dozens of state 
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categorical programs.  Charter schools may spend this funding at their discretion and are not 
bound by the many programmatic requirements that district schools must follow. 
 While the ideals of autonomy and decentralization may seem simple in concept, Hill et. 
al. (2009) have identified that the change has forced the recognition that “many of the things 
traditional school districts were originally built to do are at odds with operation of schools by 
diverse providers” (p. 1).  These technical, organizational, and political challenges are as evident 
in Los Angeles as they are in other cities in America implementing these ideas of autonomy and 
decentralization.  School districts and charter school operators must continuously work out legal 
and political challenges such as issues pertaining to facility use agreements, collective bargaining 
agreements, and compliance issues (Kerchner et. al., 2008, p. 224).  For example, in Los 
Angeles, a charter school advocacy organization is in a legal battle against Los Angeles Unified 
School District over the use of facilities space (Palmer, 2001).  These sorts of tricky issues lead 
to important policy questions as school districts grapple with providing schools more autonomy 
in a more decentralized system. 
Choice and competition.  The values of choice and competition are hallmarks of the 
charter schools movement.  While the history of American schooling has featured a good deal of 
choice, Hess (2004) points out that choice has not always been accompanied with true 
competition.  Choice has primarily come in the form of parents exercising their “residential 
choice” of purchasing a home due to the quality of the local school or leaving the public school 
sector for private schools.  Charter schools offer a bolstering of competition in the educational 
marketplace by ensuring that money follows the student so that as students moves from a 
traditional school to a charter school or vice versa, they take the funding associated with them to 
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the new school.  Thus, on the supply side, greater incentive is placed on educators to produce 
better results to attract more families.  On the demand side, parents are truly able to make 
choices on behalf of their children by choosing the best programs, and not be bound to just the 
neighborhood school.      
 In Los Angeles Unified, choice and competition play out in various forms.  Firstly, 
parents have a variety of different choices in school options.  Beyond the option of attending one 
of the 210 charter schools located throughout the city, there are many communities that are part 
of a zone of choice for schools.  Families living in such a zone of choice have the opportunity to 
choose from a myriad of school options- including thematic pilot high schools, span schools, 
traditional comprehensive high schools, and small learning communities.  Example of such zones 
of choice include the Belmont Zone of Choice in the Pico Union community, the Eastside Zone 
of Choice in the East Los Angeles and Boyle Heights neighborhoods, and the Robert F. Kennedy 
Zone of Choice in the mid-Wilshire and Koreatown neighborhoods directly west of Downtown 
Los Angeles.  Also, there are nearly 170 magnet programs located through the geography of 
LAUSD and students selected for magnets are provided transportation to such programs.  
Secondly, LAUSD’s Public School Choice (PSC) resolution created an annual process that 
identifies low performing schools and offers up those schools, along with newly constructed 
schools, to the best applicant teams to operate.  This annual competitive process pits district 
teams, pilot school teams, and charter school organizations against each other to design the best 
plans for identified schools that are eligible on the PSC list.  PSC has become the centerpiece for 
LAUSD’s school reform efforts. 
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 Under a portfolio management approach to a school district, it is critical to remain neutral 
about who runs a school.  Lake and Hill (2009) explain that neutrality “opens possibilities for 
innovation and sends a message that student performance matters” (p. 21).  As the number of 
education and service providers increase, competition and innovation become more likely.  Of 
course, this approach is fraught with significant political ramifications and public suspicion and 
“As public agencies in other countries and businesses worldwide have found, vertically 
integrated bureaucracies are not always good at solving unfamiliar problems or responding 
to tough competition” (Lake & Hill, 2009, pp. 46-47). 
Performance-based accountability.  By design, charter schools receive more flexibility 
and autonomy in governance, operations, and instruction than TPS.  In return for the flexibility 
and autonomy, charter schools are expected to perform better.  Miron (2010) categories charter 
school accountability into three categories: regulatory, market, and performance.  Charter 
schools are bound to some of the same state and federal laws and regulations as traditional 
schools, albeit fewer in most cases.  However, charter schools are bound to more market-place 
accountability as parents and students can choose to enroll and leave charter schools as they wish 
while, and at the same time, charter schools must also meet performance benchmarks as dictated 
by their charter petition with the authorizer. 
In California, charter schools operate on five-year contracts with a school district, county 
office of education, or the California State Board of Education.  Every five years, charter schools 
must be re-authorized through a process similar to the initial charter petition but must also show 
data demonstrating school progress and success.  If a charter school is not achieving, an 
authorizer can refuse a charter school’s renewal.  In this way, a process is created to hold 
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students accountable for measurable student outcomes and schools can be closed in a systemic 
way for under-performance.   
 While charter schools are intended to be held to higher forms of accountability, Miron 
(2010) has synthesized research that suggests that charter schools may, in reality, not be 
subjected to effective oversight and sufficient accountability.  Gau (2006) points out that “almost 
half of all authorizers practice limited oversight of their schools, demonstrating scant concern 
either for school quality or for compliance.  However, national trends do point out that 
authorizers have grown choosier over time about approving schools and “there are signs of the 
field’s growing commitment to quality, accountability, and results” (Gau, 2006, p. v).  For 
example, in recent months, the California State Board of Education voted in favor of approving 
new regulations that lay out a process of review of charter school performance based on 
established academic standards that may result in their revocation by the State Board (California 
Charter Schools Association, 2010).   
Summary.  These three tenets provide possible mechanisms for how charters schools can 
induce greater school reform.  The research and debate is constantly evolving.  It is crucial to 
point out that research in the performance of charter schools and debate on how charter schools 
impact school reform efforts are as polarized as ever.  While the debate and research is highly 
nuanced, the broader messages remain divergent in their support or challenge of charter schools.  
Specific to this ongoing charter schools debate, Henig (2008) in his book “Spin Cycle” ponders:  
Yet—and this is what puzzled me—in their public pronouncements, some of the same 
researchers who seemed to be moving toward some common ground were as likely as 
ever to be quoted as representing sharply divergent views.  This was partly, but not only, 
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a matter of how they were selectively quoted by journalists and advocates.  The 
resistance toward acknowledging a more nuanced and complex common ground was not 
revealed just in the popular press, however; it showed too in what the researchers 
themselves were writing.  Whereas data and findings often provided weak and mixed 
pictures, these scholars’ papers revealing framing and policy conclusions that often 
seemed to go further to reinforce the polarized positions, to resist—as if it would be a 
sign of muddy-headedness or lack of confidence—staking out a reformulated 
understanding of the charter school debate that did not fit neatly into the pro- and anti-
parameters in which the school choice argument originally was born. (p. 7) 
 Using this conceptual framework, this research will answer whether this new policy 
change results in increased access and increased capacity for students of special needs in charter 
schools.  As public schools of choice that operate autonomously from much of LAUSD’s 
policies and procedures, the new COP mandates that charter schools act as LEAs for purposes of 
special education while affording them increased funding and ability to operate autonomously 
within the LAUSD’s SELPA structure.   
 
Key Research Questions 
This research will study the effects of this major policy change.  Using the conceptual 
framework as outlined, the following questions will be answered about the new COP: 
1. How has access for students with special needs changed for charter schools 
participating in the COP?  Specifically, what changes have occurred in these schools 
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specific to the number of students with special needs served and the number of 
students served across the spectrum of needs after joining the new COP? 
2. What additional programs and services are being afforded to these students?  What 
resources or expertise support these programs that were unavailable before the policy 
change?   
Research Design and Methodology 
 The research design utilized a mixed method approach to collect qualitative and 
quantitative data to evaluate the goals of the new COP of LAUSD’s SELPA.   
The qualitative aspect of this investigation used individual interviews to gather the 
experiences and perspectives of various staff working in the LAUSD or charter schools 
participating in the COP.  The formal interviews were semi-structured with participants receiving 
the guiding questions prior to the interview session and during the session; questions were used 
to direct the discussion.  However, follow-up and elaboration questions arose during the course 
of the discussion as suggested in a semi-structured interview (Hatch, 2002, p. 94).  The entire 
session was recorded on an audio recorder.   
Using a strategy that Hatch (2002) terms as “politically important case samples” that 
“strategically include or eliminate individuals who represent certain political positions” (p. 99), 
interviews included individuals in LAUSD who had an intimate understanding of broader charter 
school issues and the implications recent policy changes can play in the school district’s reform 
efforts.  Selection was based on the researcher’s understanding of their political viewpoints, 
organizational roles and historical actions.  Thus, these individuals were likely to be apologetic 
towards charter school issues or have an understanding of LAUSD’s strategic approach to 
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leverage charter schools in improving outcomes for all schools in the district.  The researcher has 
asked for the identities of these individuals to not be concealed because their roles are significant 
for the purposes of this study.  
Quantitative data were gathered from LAUSD’s Division of Special Education, utilizing 
reports that are readily available within the school district’s data systems.  Such readily available 
reports show student enrollment data disaggregated by type of disability, special education 
expenditures, and multiple other factors relevant to this study.  Data reports not readily available 
were also requested through LAUSD’s Division of Special Education.   
In addition, further evidence was gathered through collecting artifacts such as 
informational materials, formal agreements, and professional development materials.  These 
artifacts were used to triangulate the conclusions drawn from both the qualitative and 
quantitative data.   
The data gathering occurred in three phases.  The first phase was a semi-structured 
interview with six participants, focusing on capturing their hopes and expectations of the SELPA 
reorganization and the COP.  The second phase was focused on gathering quantitative data as 
well as relevant artifacts.  The third phase was again a semi-structured interview of the same six 
participants.  In the third phase, the quantitative data was shared with participants and their 
reactions were captured.  For the participants, they engaged in a reflective process of analyzing 
the quantitative data, drew their own conclusions, and compared those conclusions to the 
previous hopes and expectations they had shared in the first interview.  Therefore, in chapter 3, 
the researcher will report the data phase by phase as well in order to reveal an evolution of 
thinking.  
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Limitations, Delimitations and Biases  
 A key limitation to this research study is that special education data reporting within 
LAUSD is inconsistent.  The current methodology of collecting the data can vary from charter 
school to charter school and frequently unfair comparisons and conclusions are drawn from the 
data.  While LAUSD’s data systems are robust, some of the data are collected through self-
reporting mechanisms of the charter schools.  This limitation will need to be carefully considered 
in this research study. 
 A major delimitation to the study is that only a segment of the charter school community 
will join the COP during the first and second years of operation.  It can be speculated that charter 
schools that volunteer to be LEAs for the purposes of special education are more sophisticated in 
their programs and services, especially at the outset of the COP.  It can also be reasoned that 
some of these charter schools are larger in size or belong in larger networks of charter schools so 
to leverage economies of scale.  Thus, it was important to collect available data of all charter 
schools, as well as those participating in the COP, for comparison purposes.   
 The major bias of this research study is that this researcher was a charter schoolteacher 
and principal for seven years and also worked as a regional director for policy and advocacy for 
the California Charter Schools Association (CCSA).  During my tenure as a regional director for 
policy and advocacy, I played an intimate role in the efforts to plan and propose the re-
organization of LAUSD’s SELPA and advocated for its passage by the LAUSD Board of 
Education.  While I is no longer employed by CCSA and no longer directly involved in the work 
around the SELPA reorganization, I am now employed by LAUSD.  Currently, this researcher is 
the Instructional Superintendent for LAUSD’s Intensive Support and Innovation Center. 
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Organization of Dissertation 
 The dissertation is organized in four chapters.  The first chapter sets the stage by 
presenting the statement of the problem, provides an overview of the literature and knowledge 
base, and explains the major policy changes in LAUSD’s SELPA structure.  It also explains the 
purpose of the study, lays out a conceptual framework, and identifies the key research questions.   
Chapter 2 explains the research design and the mixed methods approach for gathering 
data and analyzing the data.  It also outlines the selection process and the procedures utilized 
throughout the data gathering and analysis.   
Chapter 3 presents the data from the mixed methods study and explains the findings.  
Chapter 4 provides a discussion in the context of the conceptual framework and its 
implications for special education in LAUSD as well as other policies regarding special 
education and charter schools in LAUSD and beyond. 
Definition of Terms 
The following are key terms used in this research study.   
Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA):  a law passed in 2004 that ensures services to 
children with disabilities throughout the nation. IDEA governs how states and public agencies 
provide early intervention, special education and related services. 
Individualized Education Plan (IEP):  a document, written by a team, designed to meet 
the unique needs of individual students who have a disability.  The IEP is intended to outline 
each child’s educational goals and explain how teachers and other service providers tailor the 
educational experience to help the child reach the goals.  Details in the IEP should include an 
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understanding of the child’s disability, how the disability affects the learning process, and 
choosing a placement in the Least Restricted Environment (LRE) possible for that student. 
Special Education Local Plan Area (SELPA):  a structure found in the state of California 
that coordinates with school districts, County Office of Education, and other local educational 
agencies to provide a continuum of programs and services for disabled individuals from birth 
through 22 years of age 
Charter Operated Programs (COP): the newly formed branch of LAUSD’s SELPA that 
serves independent charter schools by providing the infrastructure for the administration of 
special education programs and a voice in LAUSD’s governance structure. 
Neoliberalism: the ideology that free-market ideals of competition, choice, autonomy, 
and accountability can drive reform in the current education system.  This ideology is a pervasive 
in the U.S. education reform agenda over the past two decades (Sloan, 2008).  This ideology is 







 Special education is perceived by many as a layer of complexity in the form for laws, 
regulations, and rules to the multidimensional nature of schooling.  These structures have been 
put in place to protect some of the most at-risk students within schools, in particular students 
with learning disabilities and other special physical, emotional and mental needs.  In the case of 
the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), the district has been under federal court 
oversight for its systemic non-compliance of special education law since 1996.  Therefore, the 
regulatory nature of special education is even more pronounced in LAUSD.   
 Charter schools are fundamentally grounded on the ideals of deregulation and autonomy, 
and thus exempt from many state and local regulations.  However, because charter schools are 
public schools, they are bound by the same federal laws relating to the education of students with 
special needs.  Unfortunately, this dichotomy has caused much ambiguity in terms of roles and 
responsibilities between charter schools and their authorizing agencies, and has led to tension 
and misunderstanding.  According to historic data, charter schools authorized in LAUSD have 
served fewer students identified with special needs and fewer students with moderate/severe 
disabilities as compared to the district as a whole, leaving an unfair burden on TPS to serve the 
neediest students.  Charter schools contend that the data do not tell a complete story.  One 
argument is that charter schools are serving students in a more individualized setting so fewer 
students are identified with special needs.  A second argument is that charter schools have 
operated under an agreement with the district that is ambiguous with their roles and 
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responsibilities.  In that arrangement, charter schools have not had access to the same available 
special education funding as schools of the district and thus many of the responsibilities were 
shifted to the school district.   
 Recently, a major policy change led to a reorganization of LAUSD’s special education 
division and aims to clarify the roles and responsibilities of charter schools authorized by the 
school district.  This reorganization removes some of the ambiguity and creates mechanisms to 
provide more resources in return for more responsibilities.  It hopes to ensure equal access for 
students with special needs in charter schools and increase capacity of charter schools to serve 
SWD in more innovative ways.  Over the long-term, this opportunity anticipates the sharing of 
best practices throughout the greater school system.   
Research Questions 
 The literature on the confluence of charter school and special education policies is rather 
limited.  Few studies have examined best practices in charter schools in serving students with 
special needs and “even fewer have attempted to disseminate these practices.  Moreover, special 
education practices, in general, have yielded less than remarkable outcomes for students with 
disabilities” (Finkel, 2006, p. 42). 
 Additionally, little has been written regarding policy instruments that encourage charter 
schools to not only serve students of special needs but to also spawn innovative and promising 
special education practices.  Much of the literature focuses on explaining the disparity between 
charter schools and TPS in regards to equity and access for students with special needs (Wilkens, 
2009; Marcell, 2010) but the literature is virtually silent on policy instruments that can be used to 
not only bring forth equity and access in charter schools but to leverage charter schools in 
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identifying promising practices for students with special needs.  In other words, the issues are 
regularly identified but rarely are solutions.  When policy recommendations are made, they 
typically focus on bringing forth equity between charter schools and TPS such as requiring 
charter schools to expand enrollment of students with disabilities or allocating special education 
dollars based on actual enrollment of students with disabilities.  However, as Finkel (2006) 
points out, current special education practices are generally unremarkable and policy instruments 
should not push to bring forth just equity but to encourage better practices. 
 Thus, a critical study of the convergence of charter schools and special education policies 
is needed.  This study sets out to examine the perspective of various school district and charter 
school leaders and to capture the effects of an unique policy change in the second largest school 
district in the United States, the same school district that has authorized the great number of 
charter schools and is under a keen microscope by the federal courts for its special education 
practices.  Using the conceptual framework that by leveraging key charter school tenets of 
autonomy and decentralization, choice and competition, and performance-based accountability, 
charter schools will increase their access and capacity to serve students with special needs with 
the new resources.   
 Using a mixed methods approach, I seek to answer the following questions with this 
research: 
1. How has access for students with special needs changed for charter schools participating 
in the COP?  Specifically, what changes have occurred in these schools specific to the 
number of students with special needs served and the number of students served across 
the spectrum of needs after joining the new COP. 
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2. What additional programs and services are being afforded to these students?  What 
resources or expertise support these programs that were unavailable before the policy 
change?   
Study Design 
 The study was designed to examine the perspectives of various leaders responsible for the 
implementation of this new policy change at the onset of the research, to gather and share 
quantitative data, and to interview the same leaders after they have had time to reflect on the 
data.  Thus, the study occurred in three phases: 
 Phase 1: Round One Interviews with District and Charter Leaders.  In this first 
phase of the study, qualitative data were gathered through semi-structured individual interviews 
and/or focus groups.  The interview sought to gather the experiences and perspectives of various 
district and charter leaders on the new policy change that reorganized LAUSD’s SELPA, 
including the benefits to charter schools participation, their hopes for this new structure, and the 
challenges to the current implementation of this new structure. 
 Phase 2: Data Gathering.  In the next phase of study, quantitative data on charter 
schools participating in the new COP were gathered as well as artifacts associated with the COP.  
Quantitative data were gathered through LAUSD’s Division of Special Education.  A robust 
database exists for students with special needs through the school district’s web-based IEP 
software system called Welligent.  This database tracks student-level data found in the standard 
IEP as well as related services entitled to students.  The Welligent system allows administrators 
to monitor IEP timelines and service delivery, and generate reports to ensure compliance with 
special education laws and regulations.  Much of this data is reported to the California Special 
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Education Management Information System (CASEMIS) that acts as a depository of special 
education student-level data for local education agencies throughout the state.  Data that is 
reported to CASEMIS was retrieved for the purposes of this study. Other quantitative data 
included financial reports as available through other internal reporting mechanisms.  While much 
of the data was not readily public, the information was requested from the LAUSD’s Division of 
Special Education in consultation with LAUSD’s Charter Schools Office.  The data were 
reformatted for deeper analysis.  A summary of all quantitative data can be found in Appendix C.  
Artifacts developed for the implementation of the COP were also gathered as part of Phase 2.  
Such artifacts included informational materials, formal agreements, and professional 
development materials.  A compilation of the quantitative data along with the artifacts was 
prepared by this researcher to be distributed to all participants prior to Phase 3 of the study. 
 Phase 3: Round Two Interviews with District and Charter Leaders.  In this last 
phase, a second round of semi-structured interviews took place with the same district and charter 
leaders to capture their reflections on the data.  Particular attention was paid to issues of access 
and capacity within charter school special education programs, in particular any differences in 
programs and services prior and post policy change.  Questions asked were intended to elicit the 
self-analysis and reflections of leaders with the aim of providing lessons learned for policy 
development and implementation. 
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 The process for selecting individuals to participate utilized a strategy that Hatch (2002) 
terms as “politically important case samples” that “strategically include or eliminate individuals 
who represent certain political positions” (p. 99).  The individuals must have an intimate 
understanding of the policy change as well as a broad understanding of charter schools in the 
context of LAUSD.   
 These individuals included leaders within LAUSD’s Division of Special Education, a 
special education advisor for the California Charter Schools Association (CCSA), and charter 
school leaders that have direct responsibility over special education programs.  The charter 
schools leaders represent various roles such as executive directors, principals, and special 
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as stand-alone charter schools was included.  Charter school leaders represented charter schools 
that are members of the COP.   
 Selection of these individuals was informed by this researcher’s understanding of their 
political viewpoints, organization roles and historical actions.  Thus, these individuals were 
likely to be apologetic towards the success of this policy change as well as invested in an 
outcome that is positive to charter schools as well as LAUSD as a whole.  In the presentation of 
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 An introductory and consent letter was sent to all participants prior to the first interview.  
The letter explained the purpose of the research study, provided context, shared the overall 
research questions, and provided sample interview questions.   
 Guiding interview questions were formulated prior to the interview but because 
interviews were semi-structured, this researcher responded to the situation at hand and adjusted 
accordingly.  Questions designed prior to the interviews were constructed to elicit individual 
perceptions, values, and beliefs so the use of probing questions was necessary.  Probes are 
questions that deepen the response to a question, increase the richness and depth of a response, 
and give clues to the interviewee about the level of response that is desired” (Patton, 2002, p. 
372).  These questions can be found in Appendix A and B.  A consent letter explained this 
process to each interviewee and each interviewee granted consent. 
 The researcher knew each of the interviewees prior to this research, so personal 
relationships were already established.  Spontaneous conversations were more likely because 
rapport there was already rapport.  Interviews were conducted at a location and time convenient 
to each interviewee and lasted 45-60 minutes.  The researcher took notes by hand during each 
interview and the interview was recorded on a voice-recording device.  Audio files were 
transcribed by a third-party paid transcriber. 
 In addition to consent forms, the research proposal was approved by LAUSD’s 
Committee for External Research Review (CERR).  The CERR is housed in the Research Unit of 
the Office of Data and Accountability and they are charged with the review process of all 
research proposals using guidelines prescribed by LAUSD.  This approval was necessary for 
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interviews of LAUSD employees as well as the gathering of all quantitative data on special 
education programs and services in LAUSD authorized charter schools.  The researcher gathered 
consent from all organizations connected to interview participants as well.  Lastly, the Loyola 
Marymount University Institutional Review Board reviewed and granted approval prior to the 
research study.   
Summary 
 The research hopes to reveal in this study whether particular policy levers, grounded in 
charter school tenets, will increase access and capacity for SWD.  This was accomplished 
through a study of the recent SELPA reorganization in LAUSD that lead to the formation of the 
new COP.  Qualitative and quantitative data was gathered in three phases and findings will be in 
phases to reveal the participants’ own reflective journey as each of them are intimately involved 








RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the findings from a mixed method approach to answer the key 
research questions in this study.  Specifically, this researcher analyzed: (a) transcriptions of 12 
semi-structured interviews conducted over the course of several months; (b) quantitative data 
compiled from raw data provided by LAUSD’s Division of Special Education; and (c) artifacts 
such as informational materials, formal agreements, and professional development resources.   
The two key research questions that guided this study:   
1. How has access for students with special needs changed for charter schools 
participating in the COP?  Specifically, what changes have occurred in these schools 
specific to the number of students with special needs served and the number of 
students served across the spectrum of needs after joining the new COP. 
2. What additional programs and services are being afforded to these students?  What 
resources or expertise support these programs that were unavailable before the policy 
change?   
Six individuals were selected for semi-structured interviews conducted in two rounds.  
Using a strategy termed by Hatch (2002) as “politically important case samples,” the individuals 
were selected by the researcher based on his personal understanding of the charter school special 
education landscape.  Each of the interviewees played a significant role in the implementation of 
this major policy change.  In the first round of interviews, it was important to share a summary of 
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the participants’ understanding of the COP and their hopes for the COP in increasing access for 
SWD in charter schools and increasing the capacity of charter schools to serve such students.  
While a structured protocol was used and pre-written questions were shared with interviewees, 
the researcher adjusted the line of questioning as needed, probing to deepen understanding when 
appropriate.   
Following the first round of interviews, the request was made to LAUSD’s Division of 
Special Education for three-year longitudinal data on LAUSD charter school total student 
enrollment as well as total SWD enrollment.  Enrollment of SWD was also requested by 
disability per the IEP so the number of SWD identified with moderate/severe disabilities can be 
separated from SWD identified with mild/moderate disabilities.  Financial records were also 
requested for each charter school in order to determine special education revenues as well as 
special education expenditures.  Simple calculations were also made to determine the percentage 
of SWD as compared to total enrollment as well as special education expenditures per SWD.  All 
the quantitative data was gathered over the course of several weeks through electronic mail 
correspondences as well as in-person meetings with representatives from LAUSD’s Division of 
Special Education.  The data was formatted into a one-pager that was used as the basis for the 
second round of interviews. 
In the second round of interviews, the researcher sought to capture the participants’ 
understanding of the quantitative data and to gather their overall over-all impression of the COP.  
Attention was paid to issues around access and capacity pre and post-implementation of the 
SELPA reorganization.  It was the hope that the analysis and reflection of these leaders would 
inform important policies pertaining to charter schools and special education. 
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Again, the findings will be reported in phases to show evolution of thinking of the 
participants and to reveal the participants’ own reflective process of analyzing the quantitative 
data, drawing their own conclusions, and comparing those conclusions to the previous hopes and 
expectations they had shared in the first interview.  
Participants 
SA CCSA is the Senior Advisor for Special Education at the California Charter School 
Association.  Her background includes being a special education teacher in the traditional system 
as well as being a special education teacher and administrator in nonpublic schools for students 
with emotional and behavioral disorders.  Prior to joining the California Charter Schools 
Association, she served as director of education at the Seneca Center from 1996 to 2010.  Her 
passion lies in representing children with emotional and behavioral needs that were in the child 
welfare system, especially those kids that are in foster care with need for special education 
support. 
ED Fenton is the Executive Director of Fenton Avenue Charter School, an elementary 
school located in the Lakeview Terrace community of the Northeast San Fernando Valley.  She 
has been in education 43 years in a variety of capacities including teacher, mentor teacher, 
coordinator, assistant principal, and executive director.  She was employed by Los Angeles 
Unified School District prior to July of 1993 when Fenton Avenue Elementary converted into a 
charter school.  Under her leadership, Fenton Avenue Charter School was named a California 
Distinguished School.  She has served leadership roles as a Commissioner (Environmental 
Affairs) for the City of Los Angeles as well as the California State Superintendent for Public 
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Instruction’s Public School Accountability Advisory Committee.  She is currently a member of 
the Board of Directors of the California Charter Schools Association. 
 DISE PUC is the Director of Inclusion and Special Education for Partnerships for 
Uplifting Communities (PUC), a charter management organization with 13 schools within its 
network.  She holds an Education Specialist Credential, is a licensed therapist, and is certified as 
a professional level educational therapist and as the Director of Inclusion and Special Education 
for PUC.  She currently supports resource specialist teachers, general education teachers, 
administrators, students and families.  Prior to joining PUC, she spent her more than 35 years in 
education as a principal, assistant principal, school counselor, resource specialist, curriculum 
coordinator, and teacher.   
 CEO ICEF is currently the Chief Executive Officer of Inner City Education Foundation 
Public Schools (ICEF), a network of 15 charter schools throughout Los Angeles County.  Prior 
to taking on his current role, he served as the Executive Director of the Innovation and Charter 
Schools Division in LAUSD where he worked closely with the Division of Special Education 
and the Independent Monitor of the MCD.  He also currently serves on the governing council for 
Option 3. 
 DSE LAUSD is the Executive Director of the Division of Special Education in LAUSD, 
serving more than 86,000 SWD in both traditional district schools as well as charter schools.  
She has been in education for over 40 years as both a general education teacher and administrator 
as well as a special education administrator, working in schools systems both in Canada and the 
United States.  She holds an advanced degree in policy development around special education 
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and has served on committees at both the federal and state levels regarding the reauthorization of 
IDEA and NCLB as it pertains to special education. 
 DCOP, LUASD is the Charter Operated Program Director for LAUSD and oversees the 
special education programs for over 70 independent charter schools.  Her primary responsibility 
is to lead and guide the Division of Special Education and charter organizations in working 
collaboratively to meet the needs of all SWD in charter schools.  Prior to coming to LAUSD, she 
served as the coordinator for charter schools in the Southwest SELPA and prior to that, worked 
as both a special education teacher, program specialist and coordinator in both Green Dot Public 
Schools and Inglewood Unified School District. 
Results and Findings: Round One Interviews  
In the first round of interviews, this researcher sought to understand whether there was a 
common understanding for the purpose of the COP, whether the various individuals shared a 
common understanding of the benefits of the policy change.  Also, questions sought to uncover 
how the COP would hope to bring increased access for students in charter schools and increased 
capacity for charter schools to serve students with special needs.  Lastly, the first round of 
interviews sought to capture, if there were any, the fears and challenges that charter schools may 
have of taking on the increased responsibilities and greater accountabilities for serving SWD.  
Interview questions can be found in Appendix A. 
Several common themes emerged throughout the first round of interviews among the six 
interviewees.  Some of the themes would have inevitably surfaced as a result of the questions but 
what is more surprising is that other themes surfaced without guidance by the interviewer’s line 
of questions.  The themes will be presented each in turn.   
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1. The COP addresses capacity concerns.  McConnell and Elmore (1987) explained 
that policy instruments that build capacity are used in situations to deal with “fundamental 
failures of performance by some set of individuals or institutions” (p. 16).  It also assumed that 
capacity does not exist prior so investment is needed to mobilize change for future benefit.  
Alternatively, McConnell and Elmore also explained that inducements can be used when 
capacity is assumed to exist and money is needed to elicit the desired outcome.  In situations 
where the desired results are inconsistent or infrequent, policy instruments can “induce” intended 
behaviors through addition resources, in particular money.  
Based on the feedback from the various interviews, the policy changes to establish the COP were 
both acted to build capacity as well as induce.  When asked about the purpose of the COP, 
DCOP LAUSD explained:  
The purpose of the Charter Operated Programs is to really build capacity for charters to 
serve a broader range of students with disabilities.  To be successful at and not just do it 
on the surface and say ‘Oh yeah, we’ve taken in more students, we have students with 
autism here.’  
We’re heavy on professional development and support to charters to make sure that they 
have the knowledge that they need to be able to serve students. We’re working on a way 
to develop some programs specifically targeting students with more moderate to severe 
disabilities in charters. 
In explaining how the COP will bring forth increased capacity, DISE PUC shared similar 
sentiments when she explains it is about “training, space, and of course money.  I think one of 
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the potential downfalls of the charter system [is that] charter schools are really young fabulously 
excited inexperienced people.”   
 In her interview, she explained a cautionary tale of a charter school that made a 
philosophical change to move to a more inclusive environment.  While the intent was positive 
and potentially beneficial, the lack of expertise led to poor executive and unfortunate results.  
DISE PUC explained: 
It is about training, training, and training.  There was a charter school who used to have 
lots and lots of special day classes and they made a philosophical decision at the top to 
become full inclusion over one summer.  ‘Welcome back!  You’re all inclusion teachers 
now.’  There’s such dissension, unhappiness, they were scrambling.  They had me come 
over, they had me talk to them, and they had other people come in.  They were just doing 
anything they could to rescue, frankly, their general education teachers.  But, it was the 
top’s fault for doing that to them.  You can’t do that and can’t say all of a sudden you 
should be competent in this.  If you’re going to implement something that is so radically 
different that some people may not even agree with then you better find some way to 
philosophically get them on board and then provide the support they need in order to be 
successful in doing that.  Or it’s not going to be successful. 
While DCOP LAUSD and DISE PUC explained the establishment of the COP as a capacity-
building policy, DSE LAUSD provides the additional perspective of the COP as an inducement 
by explaining how additional funding provided the opportunity to build up programs.  In her 
description, the new policy provided relief for charter schools by lowering their fair share 
contribution to lower than those in district operated programs.  She elaborated: 
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The money that was saved and kept for them in reserve was used for them to develop 
programs to serve students w/disabilities that had the more severe disabilities.  It gave 
them an opportunity to run their own programs.  It gave them some fiscal relief to do that 
so that they would have the resources to serve the more severe students.  It gave them a 
reserve where they can work together… One school might serve a class of students who 
have the most disturbances.  One school might serve a class with students of autism.  
[Charter schools] can use these funds to set up those programs to support and train the 
staff, [to provide] a fee for service with each other and act like a family in serving kids 
like we do in the district.   
It appears clear that special education costs have always been a concern and a limiting force in 
the building of special education programs and services.  The reorganization afforded additional 
resources to induce the building of capacity to increase access for SWD.  ED Fenton expressed 
these sentiments in her interview and reminded the interviewer that the charter community had 
tried to create a similar structure outside the LAUSD’s SELPA structure by establishing joint 
powers authority between a group of charter schools.  She explained:  
Charter schools were concerned with funding levels and encroachment levels and felt that 
we needed to get involved ourselves.  Something that I think it’s important to remember 
is those of us who were the very first schools who started doing the joint powers authority 
were concerned with the encroachment levels that were being put forward.  We were also 
concerned that there were charter schools that weren’t servicing special education 
students.  We knew there were charter schools saying, ‘I can’t service your child, so you 
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need to leave.’   That was something we felt would only hurt the charter movement.  We 
felt it was something it was our responsibility to do something about. 
While the joint powers authority provided a forum for collaboration and potential resource 
sharing, it lacked the actual fiscal resources to truly build up programs and services that Option 3 
has the potential to do. 
 The viewpoint that charter schools must build increased capacity to serve SWD through 
training for staff while using additional funding for programs and services was a recurring theme 
throughout the first round of interviews.  Such capacity building instruments was made possible 
by the creation of the COP.  
2.  The COP provides needed flexibility.  The policy change to create the COP Unit 
within LAUSD’s SELPA also intended to provide flexibility by allowing charter schools to, in 
essence, operate independently for the purposes of special education and to change the existing 
SELPA governance structure to allow for more input by charter schools. Option 3 is similar to 
charter schools operating as an LEA in another SELPA, just within the context of LAUSD’s 
SELPA.  The charter school will receive their state and federal special education funds, minus a 
20% contribution to the SELPA, for full responsibility in providing all special education and 
related services to students at the charter school, in the same manner as an LEA for special 
education.  The contribution to the SELPA includes a 10% contribution to support the existing 
administration and infrastructure while the other 10% contribution supports personnel of the 
COP Unit and to establish shared charter school special education programs.  In addition, the 
reorganization created a new governance structure to incorporate the management staffs from 
participating charter schools to foster participation in decision-making.  The governance 
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structure is made up of a Director of the COP and an Executive Council, with the intent that the 
COP Director engages Executive Council in policy development and implementation procedures. 
 Using the definitions established by McConnell and Elmore (1987), these changes can be 
categorized as “system-changing” and “mandates” by nature.  While charter schools that choose 
Option 3 have the responsibility of LEAs for providing all special education and related services 
for their students, they retain the fiscal and programmatic autonomy to determine how services 
will be provided.  For charters, the responsibility of ensuring access to the full continuum of 
services and placements along with all related costs is a new “mandate” for those in the COP.  
However, it was evident through the interviews that charter schools are seeing the changes 
associated with Option 3 more as a system-changing policy tool and less as a mandate.  Charter 
schools now have a direct voice to inform decisions within the SELPA as well as gaining fiscal 
and programmatic flexibility.  For the flexibility, charter schools are bound to higher 
accountabilities.  To use a common phrase, Option 3 is “tight on the goals while loose on 
means.” 
 The theme of flexibility permeated throughout the interviews in response to the benefits 
of the COP.  SA CCSA explained “Option 3 schools have the flexibility around the funding and 
how they use it.  We are now seeing some trends that tell us that flexibility is resulting in more 
kids with disabilities.”  DSE LAUSD agreed that: 
The purpose of the COP really was to give [charter schools] the autonomy to serve 
students.  It was to give the District the opportunity to work with them to make sure they 
have the kinds of supports and services that enable them to serve any students who come 
to their door and to give them some assurance that there is help for them to do that.   
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DISE PUC confirmed, “The decision to go that quickly was for the freedom.  One of the things 
that I have found as a person in charter schools is that when you teach the children you actually 
have, you’re not trying to do is one size fits all for everybody.” 
 CEO ICEF connected the theme of flexibility to an important tenet of charter schools by 
explaining how flexibility can lead to increased access and capacity while creating the conditions 
for innovation that is much needed in education, in particular the education of students with 
disabilities.  He explained that: 
The purpose of the Charter Operated Programs is twofold; both are equally important.  
The first one allows charters to move independently yet, still with the very strong 
oversight and support of the district run programs that creatively and cost effectively 
support the needs of students.  That flexibility was not possible before the COP was 
formed.  I think secondly and equally important because of that flexibility goes back to 
the core of why the charter law was passed.  So that things that we learned in the COP 
schools can be easily translated into the district by the district to save them money for 
their support of all the tens of thousands of students the district serves with special needs.  
So, I see those as both mutually beneficial and critically important to why the COP is so 
important. 
I think now that the flexibility is built in the COP, we are already seeing programs 
and an innovation starting because charters realize that now they have the opportunity to 
spread their wings and do what they believe is most important for students.  That is 
something that has already started that I am very excited about seeing progress on in the 
coming years.  I also believe that hand in hand with that is a sense of ownership that has 
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started and a sense of pride.  Historically, special education was always a political hot 
potato and it meant that charters were usually attacked for special education practices.  
Now, there’s an opportunity to celebrate special education practices.  I think that’s 
critically important. 
It is also giving the district so far an example of a very big political decision to 
relinquish control.  The districts love control, LAUSD in particular.  But, by giving up 
control it’s actually going to end up benefitting everyone, especially the district.  I’m very 
excited about being able to have that example.  
3.  The COP provides the conditions for collaboration.  This research was based on a 
conceptual framework that the LAUSD SELPA reorganization used the four policy instruments 
discussed in the previous sections to operationalize key tenets of charter schools that include (1) 
autonomy and decentralization, (2) choice and competition, and (3) performance-based 
accountability.  These tenets are a hallmark of the a neo-liberal approach to educational reform 
and outlined in the California Charter Schools Act (1992) as some of the purposes for the 
creation of charter schools.  Interestingly, these principles were not prevalent in the interviewee’s 
discussions about interactions between charter schools and district schools regarding special 
education.  Instead, the dominant theme from the interviews was one of an immense sense of 
collaboration.  According to the interviews, it was through collaboration that access for SWD to 
enroll in charter schools increased and capacity to serving these students also increased.  SA 
CCSA explained: 
I think that the charter operated program structure offers to the school is critical because 
it binds the school together at all levels.  It binds the schools to continue talking about 
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their innovation.  The people responsible for programs and service delivery or people in 
charge of service delivery have a structure where they come together regularly and talk 
about innovation and how they’re moving forward.  They have an incentive through the 
use of shared funds to continue to grow and to continue to be innovative, and continue to 
take risks in areas that charters traditionally have not taken risks when it comes to serving 
that full continuum of need. 
 
DISE PUC underscored the sense of collaboration and even expressed great surprise at the 
differences in personal interactions between District personnel and charter school staff.   She 
explained, “There was a period of time not so long ago when we’d call Los Angeles Unified and 
they’d hang up on us.  [Now], I find much more cooperation between Los Angeles Unified and 
us in this Charter Option.  Amazing actually!  Almost like the veil lifted.” 
ED Fenton explained that both charter schools and district schools have always intended 
to properly serve students with special needs and the power struggle was more about money.  
However, according to her, the policy change made finances less of an issue.  She explained: 
I hope that we all live to the letter of the law (federal and state law). I hope that we again 
put aside the financial issues to do what we need to do.  You can’t say you want to be a 
charter school and be independent because you know the best thing for your community 
and you want to put that into place and then forget about students with special needs.  Or 
say, “It’s so expensive I can’t do that.”  My hope is that we can work this out so that it’s 
in the best interest of all children.   
We’re able to offer some different and innovative programs in the charter world.  
If we can put that into place for students with special needs as well and put aside our 
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differences.  I kind of see that happening right now with the Charter Operated Programs.  
We do talk about children more.  We do talk about the kinds of needs that are out there.  
We do talk more about how to work together.  We are working together with the district.  
Absolutely incredible!  I’ve said before too at district meetings this is the most positive 
thing that I have been involved with since the charter movement and that’s almost 20 
years.  There’s always been such a push back.  I don’t know so much if it’s competition.  
We always say it’s good to have competition.  It’s not even competition.  It was always 
very negative.  It was always about money.  It does get very expensive.  This has been the 
most positive collaboration I have ever seen between charter schools and the district. 
It cannot be underestimated the importance of finances when it comes to special education.  
Special education is an underfunded mandate for all schools and it forces groups of schools to 
come together to pull resources in servicing youth across the spectrum of needs.  ED Fenton 
emphasized this point by continuing: 
I think it has really forced everyone to collaborate.  I’m being naïve about this.  I feel that 
the district and special education staff have been very honest with us.  They have been 
very honest about their challenges and they’re the same challenges as ours.  In the past, 
they have not been so honest.  They have said, “Well you just don’t do it in the charter 
world.”  Now that’s a real key to partnership when you can be honest with one another. 
We seemed to lose sight of the fact that we were here to educate all children.  
Children with learning disabilities or special needs need our help as well.  We seemed to 
have forgotten that.  I think that’s what’s happening; we talk about that more than we talk 
about the money now.  Money isn’t the key focus.  It became the key focus for so long.  
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It was the main issue.  Often times, I think we forgot about the kids, I think we forgot 
about the parents.  I think that goes for both sides. 
In general, there was a great sense of optimism about the creation of the COP from all six 
participants of the interviews.  While the most common mentioned fear was a fiscal one, 
interviewees tended to frame fiscal realities of special education as challenges rather than fears.  
DSE LAUSD explained that she does not have any particular fears and believes that most people 
generally have positive intentions: 
I don’t believe that people go into education in most cases saying “Good heavens, if a 
student with disabilities comes to my door.  I don’t want them.”  I think that people at 
schools have fears.  It’s not even the fiscal fear; it’s the fear of a teacher who’s not used 
to serving a certain type of disability.  Who gets a child in their classroom and it’s the 
fear of “I don’t know how to do my best for that child.  I need help.” It is that kind of 
fear.  So I personally don’t have fears.   
I’ve seen this District in the last 10 years grow so much and how students with 
disabilities are served here instructionally from students having a place to go, students 
being educated in a very meaningful way.  I only can see that getting better and having 
more successes for our students.  I do think we have challenges.  One of the big 
challenges is fiscal as far as the way it’s funded from the state.  Urban districts like Los 
Angeles are always going to attract families of students with significant disabilities 
because this is where all the hospitals are, the social services.  So our population is going 
to stay.   
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Lastly, CEO ICEF framed challenges in a positive light by stating, “There are certainly some 
challenges but that’s just because it’s never been done before.  So those are good challenges, 
exciting challenges that all the folks in the COP are excited and to be honest the folks in the 
district also because we are paving the way as a national example for how a traditional public 
school setting can work collaboratively on special education with their charter.” 
In using the policy instrument framework of McConnell & Elmore (1987), it can be 
concluded from the first round of interviews that the LAUSD policy that reorganized its SELPA 
and created the COP sought to change the system and to build capacity.  While new mandates 








Mandates No consideration for capacity; Forces action 
and pushes for compliance. 
Inducements Assumes capacity exists and provides 
resources (money) to mobilize change. 
System-Changing Changes existing institutions and 
redistributes authority to produce change. 
Capacity-Building Assumes that capacity does not exist so 
skill, knowledge, and competence is needed 






Results and Findings:  Quantitative Data  
To answer the critical question whether access for students with special needs changed 
for charter schools participating in the COP, this researcher requested three years of longitudinal 
data on all charter schools as it pertains to total student enrollment, SWD enrollment by 
disability, total special education allocation, and special education expenditures.  The overall 
	  
Figure 4.  This figure overlays the conceptual framework for LAUSD SELPA 
Reorganization (Figure 27) with the definitions of policy instruments as definied 
by McConnell and Elmore (1987). 
Figure 4.  Policy Instruments  
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summary of the quantitative data can be found in Appendix C.  This researcher organized the 
raw data into three categories: (a) Total Independent Charters, (b) Schools Included in Option 3 
in SY 2011-12, and (c) Schools Not Included in Option 3 in SY 2011-12.  The SELPA 
reorganization that created Option 3 occurred during the 2010-2011 school year with full 
implementation during the 2011-2012 school year.   
 
Table 2   
Summary of Quantitative Data, By Totals  
  
 
SY  2009-10 SY 2010-2011 SY 2011-12 
 
Total Independent Charters 
 
Number of Schools 147 149 155 
Total ADA 49,912 57,637 68,552 
Total SWD 4,580 4,992 6,458 
 
 
Schools Included in Option 3 in SY2011-12 
 
Number of Schools* 33 39 47 
Total ADA 21,962 23,460 27,367 
Total SWD 1,864 2,110 2,711 
 
 
Schools Not Included in Option 3 in SY2011-12 
 
Number of Schools 93 108 110 











Note.  Option 3 came to existence in SY 2011-12 when 47 schools joined the COP.  In 2009-10, 
33 out of the 47 were in existence and in SY 2010-11, 39 out of the 47 were in existence.  
Several new charter schools immediately joined Option 3 upon their opening in SY 2011-12. 
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During the first year of full implementation, 47 independent charter schools participated 
in the Option 3, allowing these charter schools to operate as a LEA for purposes of special 
education.  Of these 47 charter schools, 39 were operating in the 2010-2011 school year and 33 
were operating in the 2009-2010 school year.  Option 3 schools represent about 30% of the total 
independent charter schools, serving 27,367 SWD.  In the 2011-2012 school year, there were 110 
Non-Option 3 schools serving 39,145 total students and 3,747 SWD.   
The presentation of data was provided to all participants as seen in Appendix D, several 
days prior to the second interview.  This data served as a starting point for the second interview.  
The research aimed to capture each participant’s reaction to the data as well as their reflections 
on the policy change in light of the data. 
Two important trends that this researcher is confident about surfaced during the 
organizing of the data.  The two important trends are as follows: 
1. The total number of SWD, as well as the percentage of SWD as part of the total 
enrollment, has increased in independent charter schools over the last three years.  The 
increase has been more significant for schools that participated in Option 3 in the 2011-
2012 school year. 
2. The total number of moderate-severe students as well as the percentage of moderate-
severe students as a part of the total SWD has increased in independent charter schools 
over the last three years.  The increase has been more significant for schools that 
participated in Option 3 in the 2011-2012 school year. 
While these are two general trends that are obvious, a deeper analysis into each of these trends 
follows. 
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Increase in the number of SWD served by charter schools.  Over the last three school 
years, the number of charter schools increased from 147 to 155 and the total number of students 
enrolled in charter schools also increased from 49,912 to 68,552.  During this time, the number 
of SWD served by charter schools has also increased from 4,580 to 6,458, which is an increase 
from 9.18% of the student population to 9.42% of the student population.  This change has been 
even more significant for schools included in Option 3 that showed an increase from 8.49% in 
2009-2010 to 8.99% in 2010-2011 to 9.91% in 2011-2012.  During this time, the percentage of 
SWD actually decreased in schools not included in Option 3 from 9.72% in 2009-2010 to 8.43% 
in 2010-2011 to 9.57% in 2011-2012.  
 
Table 3 
Summary of Quantitative Data, By Percentages 
  SY  2009-10 SY 2010-2011 SY 2011-12 
 
Total Independent Charters 
 
Number of Schools 147 149 155 
Total SWD 4,580 4,992 6,458 
% SWD of Total ADA 9.18% 8.66% 9.42% 
 
Schools Included in Option 3 in SY2011-12 
 
Number of Schools 33 39 47 
Total SWD 1,864 2,110 2,711 
% SWD of Total ADA 8.49% 8.99% 9.91% 
 
Schools Not Included in Option 3 in SY2011-12 
 
Number of Schools 93 108 110 
Total SWD 2,716 2,882 3,747 









Increase in the number of moderate-severe students served by charter schools.  
Moderate-severe disabilities include designations such as autism, deaf-blindness, emotional 
disturbance, hard of hearing, and traumatic brain injury.  These disabilities include students with 
low incidence disabilities that are defined as severe disabling conditions such as severe hearing 
and vision impairments or severe orthopedic impairments. During this time period, the 
percentage of moderate-severe students served in all independent charter schools showed an 
increase.  The total number of moderate-severe students served increased from 477 in 2009-2010 
to 889 in 2011-2012, which is an increase from 10.41% to 13.63% of the total special education 
population.  For this population of students, there was an 84% increase over the three years as 
compared to a 36% increase in mild-moderate students during the same time.   
 For schools in option 3, the number of moderate-severe incidence students increased 
from 228 in 2009-2010 school year to 417 students in the 2011-2012 school year, which equated 
to an increase from 12.23% to 15.38% of the SWD population.  During this same time, the 
percentage of moderate-severe students served in non-Option 3 charter schools increased 










Summary of Data, By Totals and Percentages of Low Versus High Incidence Students 
  






Total Independent Charters 
 
Number of Schools 147 149 155 
Total SWD 4,580 4,992 6,458 
Total Low Incidence Students 477 620 880 
Total High Incidence Students 4,103 4,372 5,578 
% Low Incidence Students 10.41% 12.42% 13.63% 








Schools Included in Option 3 in SY2011-12 
 
Number of Schools 33 39 47 
Total SWD 1,864 2,110 2,711 
Total Low Incidence Students 228 304 417 
Total High Incidence Students 1,636 1,806 2,294 
% Low Incidence Students 12.23% 14.41% 15.38% 








Schools Not Included in Option 3 in SY2011-12 
 
Number of Schools 93 108 110 
Total SWD 2,716 2,882 3,747 
Total Low Incidence Students 249 316 463 
Total High Incidence Students 2,467 2,566 3,284 
% Low Incidence Students 9.17% 10.96% 12.36% 









 Concerns with fiscal reporting must be pointed out here.  Special education expenditures 
are self-reported by charter schools using a template provided by LAUSD’s Division of Special 
Education.  Cost allocation methodologies, documentation, and oversight have been inconsistent.  
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During the course of this research, LAUSD’s Office of the Inspector General published an audit 
report on this specific matter  (LAUSD Office of the Inspector General, 2011).  Some of the 
findings in the report include the following:  (a) Some charter school administrators lacked clear 
guidance and knowledge of what constituted allowable and appropriate special education 
expenditures and some charter schools have charged or allocated inappropriate and unreasonable 
costs to special education funds charter schools; (b) Most charter schools were unable to 
substantiate the methodology of allocating indirect costs, support costs, and central 
administrative costs;  (c) The responsibility of fiscal oversight and monitoring of charter school 
special education expenditures needed to be strengthened by the LAUSD’s Division of Special 
Education and LAUSD’s Charter Schools Division.  The recommendation for the report was that 
appropriate assistance related to special education program compliance was immediately needed 
and fiscal oversight and monitoring needed to be clearly defined and established by LAUSD. 
 While self-reported expenditure was recorded as part of the quantitative data gather, the 
research determined that expenditure data was unreliable for the purposes of this study as a result 
of the concerns raised in the audit report. 
Results and Findings: Round Two of Interviews  
 In the last phase of the data gathering, the researcher returned back to the same six 
individuals who were interviewed in the first round of interviews.  The quantitative data 
displayed in Appendix D were shared individually with each interviewee and each of them was 
asked to share their impressions of the data.  The goal of the second interview was to collect each 
individual’s perspective on whether they believed there has been increased access and increased 
capacity in charter schools participating in the COP.  Also, the researcher desired to capture if 
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there has been additional programs and services afforded to students, even though the COP had 
only been in existence for one year.  Lastly, follow-up questions were asked with the intention to 
elicit the analysis and reflections of leaders with the aim of providing lessons learned for policy 
development and implementation.  The questions for the second round can be found in Appendix 
B.  The results and findings of the second round of interviews have been organized around 
answering the two key research questions.   
Access—How has access for students with special needs changed for charter schools 
participating in the COP?  The comments of the interviewees support trends in the quantitative 
data that show that there has been increased access for students with special needs in charter 
schools, for those schools participating in the COP, but also across all independent charter 
schools as well. SA CCSA explained in the context of all charter schools: 
What the data is telling me is that our ultimate goal of creating a structure that gave 
flexibility to the charter schools or that would result in them expanding the number of 
students with disabilities.  The increase in scope of the type of students they serve is 
happening.  For the most part, the data validated my assumptions and I was happy about 
it.  I think that is revealing a trend and it’s trending in the direction that we had hoped.  
Again it’s still the beginning but it is meeting the hopes that we had when we initially 
started the discussions around the COP. 
CEO ICEF drew similar conclusions for charter schools participation in Option 3 and provided 
the importance of Option 3 in the context of driving collaboration between the school district and 
its independent charter schools.   
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The data at a high level is telling me the goals of Option 3; we appear to be heading in the 
right direction to meet the goals of Option 3… There’s less of a gap between District and 
Charter and I think that is helping create a more healthy conversation about special 
education between charters and traditional schools.  I’m very happy with the data.  
Obviously, it’s not going to change overnight but the trends, look very positive to 
meeting the intended outcomes of Option 3. 
His comments reiterated the important theme of collaboration that was repeated throughout the 
first round of interviews.  The idea of collaboration runs counter to the unfortunate perceived 
reality that there was little common ground in the dialogue between “District and Charter” found 
in the voices of many district and charter educators previous to the reorganization.   
ED Fenton is especially frank in her comments regarding outcome of serving low 
incidence students as a result of the policy change.  She states that, “We’ve set some goals in 
terms of looking at serving a variety of special needs students particularly the low incidence 
which charter schools typically have not done.”  For her, the changes are credited to several 
factors that are the result of strong leadership, factors that include transparency, communication 
and autonomy in decision-making.  These factors, again, support the comments made by other 
participants that through collaboration that other factors are becoming a reality.  ED Fenton 
explains:  
You know we contribute the 20% and we actually know where it goes.  We have a 
SELPA Director that is doing an outstanding job.  We see her working hard.  She is 
totally transparent in the hard work she does.  I feel like we have a Director of Special 
Education for each of our schools because she communicates with us very regularly.  She 
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gets a piece of information that she thinks will really help our programs, she sends it to 
us.  I’m going to look into this; I’m going to share it with you.  Look at this piece I think 
it’s going to work well for some of your schools that are looking at whatever.  So she’s 
very transparent and frankly she’s like that Nordstrom person.  I fell like she works for 
us.  She’s just great! So we see were our money is going for that.  The other piece is that 
we have been able to make some decisions. 
DCOP LAUSD, sharing her thoughts as a new employee in LAUSD, adds: 
What I have heard is that [charter schools] do feel a sense that there’s collaboration with 
the District in most aspects.  I definitely think they see the relationship as being far better 
than it was.  They see an openness of the District to want to collaborate and I don’t see 
any hostility which I have heard there was prior. 
Capacity—What additional programs and services are being afforded to these 
students?  Quantitative data shows only a portion of the actual picture.  While it is clear that 
charter schools are serving increasing numbers of SWD across the spectrum of needs over the 
three school years from 2009-2012, it is also important to evaluate whether there are additional 
programs and services that have been developed.  Equally important, it is important to determine 
whether a process has been created to build out new programs and services.   
Through the second round of interviews and the review of artifacts, there is strong 
evidence that the building of capacity is a major priority for the COP and a key responsibility for 
the Charter Operated Program Director.  In the review of several documents, the stated mission 
of the COP is to “facilitate a community of charter schools working together to provide 
innovative, high quality educational services for students with unique needs.”  The Charter 
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Operated Programs Director is responsible for ensuring effective coordination of special 
education services so that “access to innovative, high quality, and appropriate special education 
services for all eligible students enrolled in member schools is assured.”  One of that individual’s 
key duties and responsibilities is to “provide guidance in program development to ensure all 
students receive a free and appropriate public education at participating charter schools.”  In the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between LAUSD and participating Option 3 charter 
schools, explicit funding is ensure increased access and increased capacity.  Specifically, the 
MOU states that 10% of Option 3 charter school’s special education revenues will be retained by 
the District and allocated as directed by the Advisory Board and members of the Charter 
Operated Program, with the leadership of the Charter Operated Program Special Education 
Director.  According to the MOU: 
These funds will be used to support the personnel for the Charter Operated Program 
section of the SELPA; build management and operating procedures to create an 
infrastructure to support schools in meeting the needs of students with mild to severe 
disabilities; and, to create and implement new programs that serve students in charter 
schools. 
This MOU specifically calls out the building out of new programs as well as the support for 
students with across the spectrum of disabilities, including students with moderate-severe 
disabilities, a subset that charter schools have historically not served in as high numbers. 
Also, there is evidence that a process has been created to build out new programs and 
services.  Charter schools who wish to develop programs and services to be funded must meet 
with the Director of the COP and a specialist a minimum of three times during the planning 
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stages to ensure that systems are established to ensure collaboration, progress monitoring, and 
accountability.  Charter schools that receive funding for their programs and services must also 
agree to quarterly reviews and be open to feedback and support from Option 3 personnel and 
members.  Funding is guaranteed on a yearly cycle so the effectiveness of the program 
determines re-approval.  Most importantly, charters must be willing to all other charter school 
and District staff to visit the programs.   
The process has resulted in additional programs and services being afforded to students 
within Option 3, confirming the quantitative data that indicates an increased capacity in charter 
schools to serve more SWD as well as more SWD with moderate-severe disabilities.  Based on 
the document review, approximately $1 million worth of programs have been funded in the 
2012-2013 school year and there is currently an estimation of $1.7 million in programs for the 
2013-2014 school year.  CEO ICEF explained that the COP has created a forum to foster 
innovation through dialogue and the sharing of ideas: 
Through the COP those conversations were fostered, encouraged under the leadership of 
the [COP Director].  She helped the school take care of the paperwork and the service 
agreements that they would need to set up to essentially become a contractor with one 
another. That has now led conversations to people being able to start programs that 
previously would never have been considered starting.  Now these conversations are 
happening and the COP is sponsoring some preliminary pilots because there is actually 
money to help get programs like that off the ground.  That to me is incredibly important.  
For a small charter school spending $50,000 to buy the equipment to help with a 
particular disability is not possible.  The COP helps make that easier then that program 
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for years to come can help students not only at that school but at surrounding schools 
were students have similar disabilities and those schools are struggling to meet the needs 
of those students.  The COP is proving to be hugely helpful as fostering innovation and 
creativity at the entire COP schools.  Our collective hope is that will also then translate 
into further partnerships.   
CEO ICEF then provided an example of a specific program that has been created where Granada 
Hills Charter High School is working in partnership with an LAUSD special education center.  
He stated, “Granada Hills actually sponsors groups of students coming to their campus and 
having Granada Hills students go to the special education campus.  It’s a real relationship to be 
blunt would never happen without the COP.”  According to document reviews, this program 
currently provides community-based instruction (CBI) for six mild-severe students with the plan 
to expand to 28 students in the 2013-2014 school year from both charter schools and District 
schools.  The program will be a collaboration between Granada Hills Charter High School and 
Leichman High School, a LAUSD special education center that will provide mild-severe 
students core instruction as well as career-technical training in the context of a general education 
setting. 
 Funding to disseminate best practices is another form of collaboration.  Dissemination 
empowers successful programs to share their proven practices and assist other schools in 
implementing their programs.  ED Fenton explained: 
Charter schools were created to service students in need but also to share best practices 
and innovative practices to give teachers that ability to share what they know how to do 
best.  I don’t think we’ve ever done that in special education and the COP has allowed 
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that as well.  There are pilot programs that are being funded where District Schools and 
Charter Schools will be able to apply to participate in those Pilot programs and 
professional development programs. 
She elaborated about a pilot program being developed by the COP and the CHIME 
Institute, a non-profit organization that is widely considered a national leader in the development 
and implementation of a unique model of inclusive education:  
The institute began with an early childhood program based at California State University, 
Northridge. The success of the early childhood program, coupled with the needs of the 
community and sound research, prompted a group of parents and Cal State Northridge 
faculty to develop a charter elementary school in 2001 and a charter middle school in 
2003 (“CHIME Institute,” n.d.). 
Its program focuses on many best practices including thematic and project-based learning, co-
teaching, embedded related services, school-wide positive behavioral support, family 
partnerships, and university partnerships. Through funding from the COP, 20 schools will in 
2013-2014 will participate in a series of professional developments to bring best practices in 
creating inclusive educational environments to their respective school sites.  The three-day 
professional development will include the observation of the CHIME model in action and the 
development of an action plan for helping schools to be more inclusive.  Participating schools 
would receive three online follow-up webinars as well as two in-person follow up PD sessions 
from a CHIME professional development provider.  ED Fenton expounds: 
Everyone wonders what CHIME is doing.  Now they will actually be able to go and be 
trained in the CHIME model.  Then come back to your school and have a mentor come 
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out and check and see how you’re implementing their practices. This is how you change 
the philosophy of this school really to do the CHIME model.  We have never done 
anything like that.  Yes, on our own, I’ve visited CHIME and I’ve sent my teachers to 
visit CHIME.  This is much more formal and this is accessible to everyone now.  It 
recognizes a model that everyone talks about as this great model.  It gives the ability to 
share best practices and at the same time not do it by themselves because they’re getting 
funding for this.  We never had that happened before, at least not in a formal way.  I think 
it’s formalized some things we’ve been trying to do informally.   
Summary 
 This chapter answered the key research questions of this study through the finding of 12 
semi-structured interviews, quantitative data compiled through LAUSD’s Division of Special 
Education, and artifacts such as informational materials, formal agreements, and professional 
development resources.  The findings will be reported in in three phases, similar to the process 
used to gathered data, in order to reveal the participants’ own reflections through this process. 
 In general, it was found that access and capacity to serve SWD in charter schools 
increased as a result of the creation of the COP.  The prevailing reasons provided through the 
qualitative interviews and document analysis include increased communication and collaboration 
as well as increased participation and transparency in decision-making. 





DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Introduction 
 This dissertation attempts to answer the question whether education policies that espouse 
charter school tenets can be used to drive special education reform.  To begin the conversation, a 
more general conversation regarding the role of charter schools in educational reform should be 
discussed.  Charter schools are public schools that operate outside the governance structure of 
traditional school systems, considered by many as part of the “neoliberal” education agenda.  
This agenda is founded on the ideals of autonomy, accountability and competition and has been 
widely criticized by critical theorists and more popular writers such as Diane Ravitch, who has in 
recent years been a vocal critic of charter schools.  Ravitch (2010, Nov. 10) states “charter 
schools are promoted not as ways to collaborate with public schools but as competitors that will 
force them to get better or go out of business.”  She further explains that charter schools are 
incentivized to “push out” or “not accept” lower performing students.  In her view, such 
practices should be rejected because “Public education is one of the cornerstones of American 
democracy. The public schools must accept everyone who appears at their doors, no matter their 
race, language, economic status, or disability.”  Despite such criticism, charter schools are 
continuing to grow in numbers nationally and in California.  
The California Charter Schools Act (1992) outlines several purposes for charrter schools.  
For this discourse, three important purposes will be discussed.  The legal language states, among 
many things, that charter schools are to provide “vigorous” competition to stimulate 
improvement in all public schools, to encourage the use of difference and innovative teaching 
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methods, and to be held accountable for pupil outcomes.  Charter schools are to operate outside 
the traditional governance structure and serve as the most autonomous school model in the 
context of most school systems.  However, it is still a question whether charter schools that are 
meeting the goal of improving all public schools.   
Ni and Arsen (2010) make the appeal that while there is no clear evidence that 
competition of charter schools improve or cause harm in public schools overall, it is still too 
early to draw conclusions on the systemic effects of charter schools.  Payne and Knowles (2009) 
and Lubienski (2003) also make similar claims that competition, in of itself, is not spurring 
improvement and innovation in traditional districts.  Rather, they are more likely to argue that 
charter schools are a way to escape the perceived inflexibilities of the bureaucracies found in 
large school systems and collective bargaining agreements.  In other words, they may argue that 
those who operate charter schools or work in charter schools are choosing “autonomy from” the 
traditional school systems as opposed to “autonomy to” operationalize innovative practices.  
While this mindset is unfortunately prevalent in the deeply polarized local and national dialogue 
on charter schools, the narrative that was formed in this research points to something different in 
the context of the COP in LAUSD.  
In her dissertation, Kindel (2011) discusses the intended and unintended consequences of 
the California Charter Schools Law and describes the complex relationship between charter 
schools and TPS as the “ying yang of competition versus collaboration” (p. 67)  In her 
qualitative study, she interviewed twenty-two individuals who played a role in the passage of the 
California Charter Schools Law as well as other prominent educators, policy makers, and 
practitioners.  The perspective of those individuals varied on whether market-based forces such 
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as competition are needed in education.  A few felt strongly that competition is needed as a way 
to reform bureaucracy and school boards.  A few others took the opposite viewpoint and 
rationalized that education in a high stakes, competitive environment is unhealthy.  However, 
most stood somewhere in middle with nuanced beliefs and uncertainty about whether 
competition is truly driving improvement throughout the education system.  When asked whether 
competition is a force of change in the culture at traditional schools, a prominent charter school 
leader and advocate explains that “[charter schools] is very spotty thus far” (Kindel, 2011, p. 
116). 
 For this research, I used a conceptual framework that to increase access and capacity for 
charter schools to serve SWD, the tenets espoused by charter schools such as autonomy and 
decentralization; choice and competition; and performance-based accountability must be 
constructed through policy instruments as described by McDonnell and Elmore (1987).  I sought 
to understand whether these tenets would lead to increasing access and capacity in charter 
schools for SWD.  Furthermore, an extended goal for this research is to understand if these tenets 
of charter schools can improve the educational outcomes for all students.  In other words, will 
providing schools autonomy within a very centralized and bureaucratic system facilitate 
increased access and increased capacity in charter schools to serve SWD?  Will competition 
between schools and providing more choice for parents and students facilitate increased access 
and increased capacity to serve SWD?  Will performance-based accountabilities for charter 
schools facilitate increased access and increased capacity to serve SWD?  I pose these questions 





 I will first draw conclusions to the key research questions of this dissertation.  
Conclusions will be extracted from qualitative data from two rounds of semi-structured 
interviews of “politically important case samples” as termed by Hatch (2002); artifact analysis of 
informational documents, formal agreements, agendas and minutes, and professional 
development materials; and quantitative data gathered from LAUSD’s Division of Special 
Education.  The two key research questions again are: 
1. How has access for students with special needs changed for charter schools 
participating in the COP?  Specifically, what changes have occurred in these schools 
specific to the number of students with special needs served and the number of 
students served across the spectrum of needs after joining the new COP? 
2. What additional programs and services are being afforded to these students?  What 
resources or expertise support these programs that were unavailable before the policy 
change?   
Access.  First, the data are showing that access for students with special needs has 
increased over the last three years for all independent charter schools as defined by the total 
number of SWD served as well as the percentage of total student enrollment.  Furthermore, the 
total number of students with moderate-severe disabilities has increased at a greater rate than 
students with mild-moderate disabilities.  Thus, access has not only increased for SWD in 
general but access has increased across the spectrum of needs, in particular those students who 
are most challenging to serve.   
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For schools participating in the COP, SWD represent a slightly higher percentage of the 
total student enrollment than schools not participating in the COP in the 2011-2012 school year, 
9.91% and 9.57% respectively.  The more significant difference rests in the percentage of 
students with special needs that have disabilities in the moderate-severe range.  For schools in 
the COP, the percentage is 15.38% versus 12.36% for schools not in the COP.  This difference in 
access is supported by the interpretations of interviewees as well as the artifact analysis.  As one 
participant concludes, 
If you look at the Option 3 schools, there’s been a steadily increase in the number of 
students with disabilities that they’re serving which is really what we wanted Option 3 to 
do.  The data for Option 3 as far as the percentage of students with disabilities, their total 
ADA, that’s the trend that we were hoping to see with this.  You see these trends whether 
you look at the percentage of moderate-severe or whether you look at the high incidence 
students. 
In the review of documents, new programs have been developed or are in the process of being 
developed with the 10% set aside.  For the 2013-2014 school year, funding has been allocated to 
develop or enhance 15 programs in the COP and 14 out of the15 programs are focused on 
serving students with moderate-severe students.  Examples include the creation of four programs 
focused on serving students with autism and three programs focused on students with emotional 
disturbance.  Thus, one can conclude that there has been an increase in access for charter schools 
in Option 3. 
Capacity.  The creation of the COP provided the opportunity for charter schools to create 
programs and services for students with special needs.  From the interviews and artifact analysis, 
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the mission of the COP is clearly focused on providing innovative and high quality educational 
services for students with unique needs.  There is a coordinated effort to sustain, enhance, and 
build programs for SWD, especially those with moderate-severe disabilities.  Even more 
importantly, there is thinking invested and resources allocated to ensure that programs are of 
high quality as well.  All programs must go through an extensive planning with a commitment to 
quarterly reviews.  The review process is facilitated by the director of the COP and elicits the 
participation of a broader range of peers.  Also, funding runs on a year-to-year cycle and covers 
only 50% of the total program costs, ensuring that schools have “skin in the game” and thus are 
invested in the building up of the programs with quality and fidelity.   
It is powerful to see well-regarded programs such as CHIME disseminating their best 
practices around inclusion across the charter school community through professional 
development funding provided by the COP.  Collaboration of this sort occurred previous to the 
creation of the COP but as explained by charter school leaders, such collaboration was informal 
and minimal.  Now, formalized structures have been created along with the resources necessary 
to ensure continuous dialogue and quality professional development.  In the case of CHIME, four 
charter schools will participate in a pilot program during the end of the 2012-2013 school where 
they will receive professional development on site at CHIME Institute's Schwarzenegger 
Community School along with three online webinars.  Then, professionals trained in the CHIME 
model will visit implementation sites for two days of follow-up sessions.  As school leaders, they 
are keenly aware that professional development that is experiential, collaborative, progressive, 
and sustained over time is more effective.  The systems being put place are laying the 
groundwork for quality professional development for future years.  For the next school year, 
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funding has been allocated to increase the scope from four pilot charter schools to twenty District 
and charter schools beginning in the Fall of 2013.  
It is also powerful to see capacity building through new forms of collaboration between 
the District and charter schools.  It is unfortunate that formalized collaboration between charter 
schools and LAUSD has been historically minimal.  The school district, in its past, has not 
always been a willing partner to charter schools and the opposite can also be said.  To change the 
perception requires time and trust needs to be built but there are strong hints that things are 
changing.  ED Fenton states: 
I want to say our relationship with LAUSD is so much better on every level than I could 
have imagined.  I think we’re availing ourselves of the trainings much more.  I think that 
because we’re having our Coordinator Council meetings that people from the District are 
coming in and sharing with us information that we didn’t used to get until sometime 
someone got in trouble for it.  The flow of information between LAUSD and PUC was so 
horrible.  The difference is just not notable.  It is shockingly notable! 
Recently the Gates Foundation recently invested $25 million in seven cities for collaboration 
between traditional schools and charter schools.  Unfortunately, Los Angeles was unable to 
secure any funding, even though LAUSD is the largest authorized of charter schools in the 
country with over 210 charter schools serving more than 110,000 students.  Instead of seeking 
for sincere collaboration with charter schools, many in LAUSD has seen charter schools as 
unwelcome competitors.  That is why the partnership between Granada Hills Charter High 
School and LAUSD to serve students in a CBI are critical in changing the paradigm.  As DSE 
LAUSD articulates in one interview: 
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It just feels like we’re all working together for the benefit of students.  It’s an opportunity 
for us to use our different schools as learning labs.  We can send teachers, our staff to one 
of the COP schools to see how they’re doing something.  We take that back to our 
schools, and then they get an opportunity to come visit our programs as well and see how 
we’re doing. 
Thus, based on the evidence collected, charter schools in Option 3 have increased their capacity 
to serve SWD. 
In summary, there are strong signs that access and capacity have both increased as a 
result of the COP through both quantitative as well as qualitative measures.  One may argue that 
the data also indicates that charter schools that chose to participate in the COP already had 
greater access and capacity to serve SWD across the spectrum of needs.  As compared to their 
counterparts, there has been a steady increase in SWD enrollment numbers even prior to SELPA 
reorganization in COP charter schools.  However, access and capacity has increased even more 
and there is the foundation for even more accelerated growth. 
Lastly, and most importantly, the interviews surfaced a great sense of optimism for 
charter schools and District collaboration around special education.  While there are suggestions 
that there may still be some fears, excitement abounds for the collaborative work.  Collaboration 
of this sort was not the norm previously, in particular with issues pertaining to special education.  
Interestingly though, collaboration between charter schools and TPS is not explicitly stated as a 




Discussion of the Conceptual Framework 
 The conceptual framework as seen in Figure 2 of this study is based on a merger of 
policy instruments as described by McDonnell and Elmore (1987) and charter school tenets of 
autonomy and decentralization; choice and competition; and performance-based accountability.  
This study explained how such tenets led to greater access and capacity for SWD in charter 
schools.  At the highest level, can policies that espouse such tenets improve special education 
outcomes for students not only in charter schools but all students, in general?  Since I concluded 
that there has been increased in access and capacity, I will now pose the following questions 
based on my conceptual framework for more discussion: 
1. Did providing autonomy within a very centralized and bureaucratic system increase 
access and capacity to serve SWD?   
2. Did competition between schools and providing more choice for parents and students 
facilitate increase access and capacity to serve SWD?   
3. Did performance-based accountabilities for charter schools increase access and 
capacity to serve SWD?   
To answer these questions, it is critical to look back at the interview responses from the six 
individuals selected for this study.  These individuals, as Hatch (2002) terms as “politically 
important case examples” have an intimate understanding of the SELPA reorganization and the 
historical context of charter schools and special education from which the COP formed.  Two of 
the participants and the researcher played were the key negotiators in the reorganization of the 
SELPA.  One participant was the founder of a charter school that converted a LAUSD 
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elementary school to a charter school soon after the passage of the California Charter Schools 
Act (1992) and continues to operate the school after 20 years.  The other participants have all 
worked in both charter schools and district schools and play critical roles in the COP.   
 Autonomy and decentralization.  In their interview responses, the theme of autonomy 
and decentralization was prevalent.  The preferred terminology that was used was “flexibility” 
and flexibility came in many forms.  There was discussion around flexibility around funding and 
how to use it.  There was flexibility in programming and not a “one size fits all” approach to 
special education.  There was even flexibility in which charter schools could participate in the 
new SELPA as Option 3 was one of three potential options for charter schools in LAUSD. 
DDSE LAUSD has the primary responsibility of ensuring special education compliance and 
achievement outcomes under the pressure of federal court oversight.  For her to divert from the 
norm and support a flexible and autonomous approach to special education, often characterized 
as over-regulated and compliance-driven, demonstrates a willingness to be innovative and 
courageous.  In a reflective moment during the interviews, DDSE LAUSD shares that: 
I think a lot was caused by the fact that we had not planned for how things could be done 
differently.  Everybody had that we were going down a certain path, we have a Consent 
Decree, this is where we’re going and now all of a sudden there were people working 
with us who didn’t have the same kind of guidelines, necessary policies to follow.  Some 
of the public school operated programs and administrators felt that they had to do more or 
did not get the same kind of fair shake as charter schools.  I think the charters schools felt 
that they were paying to support programs that were not there, that they were serving 
students in a different way. 
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Thus, in my opinion, providing autonomy did play a critical role to increase access and capacity 
for SWD in charter schools as a result of the policy change.  In the context of special education, 
the autonomy to self-govern and self-dictate is a critical factor to driving performance and 
innovation. 
 Competition and choice.  Competition is a hallmark of the charter schools movement 
and as stated in the California Charter Schools Act (1992), charter schools are to provide 
vigorous competition within the public school system to stimulate continual improvement in all 
public schools.  Charter schools act as a potential competitive force because students who move 
from a traditional school to a charter school takes the funding associated with their attendance 
along with them.  However, competition does not reveal itself as an impetus for change in the 
context of special education.  The term “competition” was never used by any of the participants 
to explain changes have occurred after the reorganization of the SELPA.  In the stated purposes 
for the LAUSD SELPA reorganization as spelled out by the LAUSD Board of Education Report 
149-10/11 (2011), terms such as flexibility, autonomy, and accountability were used, yet there is 
no mention of competition.  While it can easily be understood that the term “competition” is not 
desirable on a highly politically-charged issue in a highly politicized environment, the term was 
not even mentioned once in twelve interviews.  There are several reasons why I believe this to be 
the case.  First, special education is an encroaching program.  The funding provided for the 
purposes of serving SWD is insufficient to the actual needs and in LAUSD, the actual costs 
exceed $1,400 per ADA.  To be specific, $1,400 of general funds associated with each child, not 
just special education children, goes towards the overall contribution to special education 
programs in LAUSD.  Thus, there is not competitive desire to enroll SWD.  Secondly, choice in 
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special education programs has historically been limited, in particular for students with 
moderate-severe disabilities, in both charter schools and TPS.  For example, if you are a parent 
of a child with autism, your choice in education may be limited to only those schools that have 
programs and services to support children with autism.  For many charter schools, they argue 
that because specific programs are unavailable at their schools, children with specific needs are 
better served in alternative programs.  Lastly, and most significantly, the structure resulting from 
the reorganization sets up incentives for collaboration rather than competition.  Charter schools 
are provided significantly more resources and autonomy for programming but these autonomies 
are accompanied with more accountability.  Charter schools have no choice but to serve all 
SWD, across the spectrum of needs, so resource sharing and pool risking is critical.  This 
incentivizes to not work independently and forces charter schools to collaborate.  Also, the funds 
created by the10% set-aside, amounting to nearly $2 million for the 2013-14 school year, must 
be allocated through a governance council composed of charter school operators.  The 
governance council is a formalized forum for dialogue that has resulted in collaborative rather 
than competitive efforts to improve educational outcomes both in charter schools and in District 
schools.  
 Performance-based accountability.  Lastly, it is important to discuss the tenet of 
performance-based accountability in the context of special education in LAUSD.  Over the last 
several years, charters schools have drawn attention publicly, fairly or unfairly, for their 
provision of special education.  The construct of charter schools acting as a “hybrid” entity for 
purposes of special education was created as a policy compromise, creating complications with 
compliance and operations.  As the LAUSD moves to improve its special education outcomes 
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during the MCD, scrutiny on charter schools has drawn additional attention by the LAUSD’s 
Independent Monitor.  With the modernization of data systems such as Welligent in LAUSD, 
information can be extracted at real-time such as enrollment data, IEP compliance, service 
provision, etc.  Charter schools are required now required to sign a MOU regarding the provision 
and funding of special education services as a requirement for charter school approval and 
renewal.  The MOU dictates matters of responsibility, safe-guards, funding, and SELPA 
participation.  All these have contributed to the increased accountability for charter schools in the 
performance of SWD.  
 Of the three tenets of autonomy and decentralization, choice and competition, and 
performance-based accountability, the one that is not found to be a factor in increasing access 
and capacity for students with special needs in charter schools is choice and competition.  
Instead, the interviews and the artifacts revealed a clear sense of increased collaboration between 
LAUSD and charter schools.  As previously stated, competition is stated by the State of 
California as a purpose for charter schools to drive improvement for all schools but in the case of 
special education, there is no evidence of such found in this research. 
Implications for Future Research 
 The COP is a new construct that has only existed for one year.  The longitudinal data 
gathered was for three years but the COP was only implemented the last of the three years.  The 
long-term effects of this policy change must continue to be studied.  It would be important to 
understand whether access and capacity continue to increase.  Also, will there continue to be 
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collaboration and innovation that results from the COP and how will the best practices inform 
both District and charter schools? 
 As new programs are developed, it will be important to understand the effectiveness of 
such programs.  Systems that are being established by the COP should allow for regular program 
evaluation to determine the most effective programs for dissemination.  
 The ultimate goal should not be to have equal number of SWD in charter schools and 
district schools.  Past research has already pointed out that there is over-identification as it 
pertains to SWD across the nation and the case is no different in LAUSD.  Also, the cost of 
special education needs to be examined along with the numbers of students identified with 
special needs.  The costs associated with special education is ever increasing and encroaching 
more into general funds every year. Thus, future research should focus on innovation in the area 
of programming and service delivery to support the learning of SWD, in both charter schools and 
TPS.          
 As an education community, we continue to explore more effective approaches to serving 
students with disabilities and as school leaders and policy makers, we must continue exploring 
the necessary conditions where innovation can be brought forth.  As DDSE LAUSD explains: 
So, if this can operate for the charter schools, if we give our schools autonomy and if we 
can do something with our own schools, should they not be able to function and operate 
in the same method.  It’s important for us that it works because it really is have the model 
for us to say would this work with our pilot schools, would this work with our small 
learning communities, would this work with this type of school.  Can we give them that 
flexibility? 
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Policy instruments that utilize certain charter school tenets showed promising results in this 
research.  However, more investigation is needed to understand whether such results will sustain 
over time.  Furthermore, it would be important to understand if such policies would have similar 
effects in other context.  For example, could such policies be utilized in the context of District 
schools, such as pilot schools?  It is critical to exploring necessary policy levers to drive 
innovation in schools, especially as it pertains to serving the most needy youth.    
Implications for Public School Policy 
 In her dissertation, Kindel (2011) points to the dissatisfaction with public education as a 
major force that contributed to the passing of the California Charter Schools Act but then 
examines many of the law’s unintended consequences on education.  Some of the unintended 
consequences include inconsistent oversight and authorization practices, reliance on social and 
political capital for money and support, and persistent opposition from groups such as teacher 
unions.  These unintended consequences have contributed to the schisms that have always 
existed in the American education ecosystem.  In a rather personal and lucid moment, Kindel 
(2011) shares:  
Although my life in politics has taken me deep into the land of sharp opinions and grand 
egos, I have never been among people who hold such strong and often polarizing 
opinions as in the education environment.  Many times during the research process and 
event recently, I have been unwilling to state an opinion on an issue in education because 
I feel I will be regarded as favoring a certain camp, which would be limiting to my 
effectiveness and progress. The children lose when adults are so polarizing (p. 96). 
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While she does not explicitly call it out, another unintended consequence of the 1992 California 
Charter Schools Act is the exacerbation of adult segregation in the public schools system.  The 
public call for less isolation and more collaboration cannot be mandated; the right incentive 
structures must be put in place.  System changing practices such as co-locations between charter 
schools and TPS are grounded in the aspirations that placing schools side-by-side will force 
collaboration and hopefully lead to the sharing of best practices.  However, there is extensive 
anecdotal evidence that would conclude otherwise.  Inducements from grant funding for district-
charter collaboration assumes that capacity already exists and additional resources will just 
mobilize change.  Such inducements have not proven to have long-lasting impact.  As 
demonstrated by LAUSD’s SELPA reorganization to establish the COP, a combination of 
incentive structures is needed to drive the necessary changes to encourage collaboration.  In this 
particular case, a combination of all four policy instruments as described by McConnell and 
Elmore (1987) in varying degrees brought about the necessary incentives to address capacity 
concerns, provide needed flexibility, and provide the conditions necessary for authentic 
collaboration.  Only through the combination of these forces did access and capacity increase for 
charter schools to serve SWD.   
As an individual who served as a teacher, school administrator, and district leader for his 
entire professional career, I have witnessed and experienced first-hand a public education system 
that can often leave an individual powerless, isolated, and repressed.  Those who are called to 
take on the important duty of educating youth, especially those who serve youth living in 
circumstances of poverty and in historically underserved communities, deserve to work in a 
professional ecosystem that provides them with the necessary training and resources, the 
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autonomy to make sound judgments for their students, and the opportunity to engage with other 
professionals in problem-solving and idea-sharing.  As a young and inexperienced teacher, I was 
left to “sink-or-swim” in my classroom.  As I slowly developed to be a somewhat competent 
teacher, I took on the persona of a “Rambo” teacher, one who trusts no one and takes on all 
challenges individually, asking for no assistance from others.  Those years left me being isolated 
and often powerless professionally.  My feelings are not atypical of many educators in American 
public education.  Only in later years did I finally start experiencing the professional growth and 
transformative powers of networking and authentic collaboration.   
Johnson (2010) describes innovation as the collision of great ideas.  Great ideas are 
cobbled together through the sharing of ideas, typically in group settings.  Historically, these 
“liquid networks” are places such as coffee houses during the Enlightenment or the atypically 
designed workplaces of today’s Silicon Valley companies.  In such environments, ideas are 
connected and cultivated rather than protected and depressed.  The greatest innovations in human 
history stem from many great ideas coming together through human interactions rather than the 
isolated genius having an eureka moment.    
Public education, like all segments of our society, is rapidly reinventing itself.  As our 
country is moving ever more closely to a set of national standards, the incentive to increase 
networking and collaboration will grow between educators, schools, and organizations will grow.  
Education policies that just drive for autonomy and decentralization, competition and choice, and 
performance-based accountability cannot be successful.  The right incentive structures must be in 
place to offer necessary resources, provide true flexibility, and encourage authentic 
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collaboration.  Policy makers must take all these factors into consideration so to elicit the 




Interview #1 Protocol with District and Charter Leaders 
 
Introduction 
- Thanks for their time 
- Review of introductory and consent letter 
General background information 
- Name and professional experience 
- Experience working with students with disabilities 
- Experience working with special education policy 
- Experience working with charter schools 
Questions 
- What is your current role with charter schools and/or special education? 
- What are the challenges to serving students with special needs in charter schools? 
- What is the purpose of the COP?  What are the benefits? 
- What changes do you hope to see as charter schools participate in the COP? 
- Will the COP bring about increased access to students with special needs in charter 
schools? 
- Will the COP bring forth increased capacity within charter schools to serve students with 
special needs? 
- Will the COP bring forth innovative special education practices and why? 
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- What are the fears and challenges you face currently and what future fears and challenges 




Interview #2 Protocol with District and Charter Leaders 
 
Introduction 
- Thanks for their time 
- Review first interview 
Questions 
- Have you had a chance to review the quantitative data?  What is the data telling you? 
- Is the data meeting the hopes you had for the SELPA reorganization and the COP? 
- Are there any surprises?  Are their any issues that you see?  What is lacking? 
- What practices differ since the creation of the COP?  What practices remain the same? 
- What programs or services were made possible by participating in the COP? 






Quantitative Data Collection 
 
1) Student enrollment overall 
2) Number of SWD overall along with % of overall enrollment  
a. Number of SWD identified as mild/moderate along with % of overall enrollment 
b. Number of SWD identified as moderate/severe along with % of overall enrollment 
3) IEP / Compliance Data 
a. Initial assessment numbers- students entering special education 
b. Exit IEPs- students existing special education 
c. % of SWD meeting annual IEP goals 
d. Compliant IEP as % of overall caseload  
4) Financial reports 
a. Total special education revenues 
b. Expenditures (as self-identified) 
c. Expenditures as % of Revenues 
d. Special education revenues- rate per SWD 




 Summary of Quantitative Data 
Total Independent Charters 
  SY  2009-10 SY 2010-2011 SY 2011-12 
Number of Schools 126 147 157 
Total ADA 49,912 57,637 68,552 
Total SWD 4,580 4,992 6,458 
Total Low Incidence Students 477 620 880 
Total High Incidence Students 4,103 4,372 5,578 
% Low Incidence Students 10.41% 12.42% 13.63% 
% High Incidence Students 89.59% 87.58% 86.37% 
% SWD of Total ADA 9.18% 8.66% 9.42% 
Gross Allocation $38,900,570.44 $48,532,777.37 $51,082,078.18 
Fair Share Contribution (10% - 40%) $11,392,214.01 $14,544,118.30 $11,828,720.35 
Self Reported Expenditures $47,875,955.68 $51,045,166.00 $47,146,234.00 
% Expenditure / Gross Allocation 123% 105% 92% 
Expenditure / Total SWD $10,453.27 $10,225.39 $7,300.44 
    Schools Included in Option 3 in SY2011-12 
  SY  2009-10 SY 2010-2011 SY 2011-12 
Number of Schools 33 39 47 
Total ADA 21,962 23,460 27,367 
Total SWD 1,864 2,110 2,711 
Total Low Incidence Students 228 304 417 
Total High Incidence Students 1,636 1,806 2,294 
% Low Incidence Students 12.23% 14.41% 15.38% 
% High Incidence Students 87.77% 85.59% 84.62% 
% SWD of Total ADA 8.49% 8.99% 9.91% 
Gross Allocation $17,116,681.21 $19,754,671.00 $20,222,674.43 
Fair Share Contribution (10% - 40%) $5,033,369.78 $5,983,442.61 $2,022,267.44 
Self Reported Expenditures $19,862,747.30 $22,205,637.00 $18,824,184.00 
% Expenditure / Gross Allocation 116% 112% 93% 
Expenditure / Total SWD $10,655.98 $10,524.00 $6,943.63 
    Schools Not Included in Option 3 in SY2011-12 
  SY  2009-10 SY 2010-2011 SY 2011-12 
Number of Schools 93 108 110 
Total ADA 27,950 34,177 39,145 
Total SWD 2,716 2,882 3,747 
Total Low Incidence Students 249 316 463 
Total High Incidence Students 2,467 2,566 3,284 
% Low Incidence Students 9.17% 10.96% 12.36% 
% High Incidence Students 90.83% 89.04% 87.64% 
% SWD of Total ADA 9.72% 8.43% 9.57% 
Gross Allocation $21,783,889.23 $28,778,106.37 $29,330,601.32 
Fair Share Contribution (10% - 40%) $6,081,752.24 $8,560,675.70 $9,806,452.91 
Self Reported Expenditures $23,341,044.53 $28,839,529.00 $26,640,660.78 
% Expenditure / Gross Allocation 107% 100% 91% 
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